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TRUST IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: STATE 




The conventional wisdom, backed by legitimacy research, is that 
most people obey most of the laws, most of the time. This turns out 
to not be the case in a study of state and local involvement with im-
migration enforcement, especially the federal program in which the 
federal immigration enforcement agency, U.S. Department of Home-
land Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), identifies 
immigrants in state and county jails who may lack legal status and 
requests that local law enforcement agencies (LEAs) detain or hold 
those immigrants beyond their scheduled release for further investi-
gation of their removability under civil immigration laws. Since the fed-
eral government’s clarification that its detainer requests are voluntary, 
a significant and growing number of LEAs have declined to hold im-
migrants. The spread of states and local jurisdictions withholding co-
operation ultimately led to a reworking of federal-state partnerships 
around immigration enforcement marked by the replacement of Se-
cure Communities with the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP).1
 Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School. Ph.D. University of California Berke-
ley; J.D. New York University Law School. My sincere thanks to Raquel Aldana, César García 
Hernández, Christopher Lasch, David Rubenstein, Juliet Stumpf, and the engaged participants 
in the 2015 AALS Academic Symposium on Executive Action and Emerging Immigration Schol-
ars Workshop. Carey DeGenaro provided valuable research assistance. 
 1.  Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is the primary federal agency charged 
with immigration enforcement and deportation from the U.S. interior. Secure Communities, 
sometimes abbreviated as S-Comm, involves two components: first, it permits information shar-
ing between ICE and the FBI and; second, it permits ICE requests for extended detention of 
immigrants identified within the database as lacking legal status. The program that replaced 
Secure Communities is named the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP). Memorandum from 
Jeh Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas Winkowski et al., Acting Dir., U.S. 
Immigration & Customs Enf’t (Nov. 20, 2014) (on file with the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security) [hereinafter November 2014 Secure Communities Memo]; Secure Communities: 
Overview and Fact Sheet, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
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This Article is part of a scholarly project to examine cooperation 
with executive action and nonbinding federal policy. In other research, 
I have shown that states’ perceptions of the federal Deferred Action 
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy were integral to the subsequent 
enactment of integrative state policies that furthered the aims of 
DACA.2 This Article extends those insights to another aspect of immi-
gration policy. This Article makes three key contributions to scholar-
ship. First, it offers a theoretical frame and empirical method for 
analyzing state cooperation with nonbinding federal policies, such as 
executive actions, that combines cooperative federalism with proce-
dural justice theory. Second, it applies these theories to a timely study 
of the evolving norms of state and local engagement in immigration 
enforcement. Third, it extrapolates from the case study of evolving 
immigration detainer policy a model of state noncooperation as policy 
(re)making in immigration enforcement. It concludes with lessons for 
DHS’s continued efforts to rebuild state-local cooperation in immigra-
tion enforcement. 
I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: LEGITIMACY AND UNCOOPERATIVE 
FEDERALISM
A. Legitimacy and State Cooperation 
The concept of legitimacy is defined as the recognition of the ex-
ecutive branch’s authority to govern as appropriate, proper, and just. 
This definition is based on classical conceptions of legitimacy origi-
nating with Max Weber. Weber defines a legitimate social order as 
one where everyday citizens perceive an obligation to obey legal au-
thorities.3 Socio-legal scholars extend this definition to the study of 
legal compliance, with a prominent example being Tom Tyler and his 
co-authors who state, “[L]egitimacy is the belief that the law and 
agents of the law are rightful holders of authority; that they have the 
right to dictate appropriate behavior and are entitled to be obeyed; 
and that laws should be obeyed simply because that is the right thing 
 2.  See Ming H. Chen, Beyond Legality: Understanding the Legitimacy of Executive Action 
in Immigration Law, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (examining legitimacy as motiva-
tion for state cooperation with DACA). 
 3.  MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 215 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Univer-
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to do.”4 This form of legitimacy is based on the justice of the proce-
dures through which decisions are made, which studies consistently 
show have a substantial impact across a wide variety of contexts.5
Legitimacy is also based on inferences about the character of an au-
thority and especially the trustworthiness of one’s relationship with the 
authority; it is based on the assumption that knowing another’s char-
acter and motives tells us whether she will act reasonably in the fu-
ture, whatever the outcome of the decision.6 While legitimacy may be 
combined with other psychological motivations—and indeed, may 
overlap with other motivations—it is distinct: the essence of legitimacy 
is that the belief in institutional authority is itself a reason for obeying 
the law. That sense of fidelity to legitimate authority operates along-
side, and in relationship to, legal contestation. It is the main subject of 
this Article. 
Subsequent research recognizing the difficulty of addressing so-
cial problems without credible enforcement shifts the focus from obe-
dience to mandatory law to deference to voluntary ones.7 Whereas 
compliance is concerned with individual obedience to the law, coop-
eration is concerned with eliciting voluntary deference or furtherance 
of the law in group settings where adherence to a binding law is not 
necessarily required. Compliance is often motivated by the external 
threat of legal enforcement or promise of a reward; cooperation is vol-
untarily given (or withheld) and motivated by internal forces distinct 
from calculations of punishment or reward.8 Shifting from compliance 
to cooperation leads to a changed focus on the internal motivational 
forces that lead people to undertake voluntary actions, many of them 
social motivations, and the discretionary quality of the actions taken. 
Rules and policies can create opportunities to cooperate or they can 
 4.  Jonathan Jackson et al., Why Do People Comply With the Law?, 52 BRITISH J. CRIM.
1051, 1053 (2012). Tyler and his collaborators use empirical studies to demonstrate that every-
day compliance with the law is shaped not only by instrumental concerns such as incentives 
and sanctions. It is also shaped by what people think about the procedural fairness of laws. TOM 
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 4 (Princeton University Press 2006) (1990). Many other stud-
ies of law and society have found similarly robust associations across cultural contexts and 
substantive areas.
 5. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 4, at 115–18, 174–78. 
 6.  Id.; TOM TYLER & YUEN HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION 
WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 58–64 (2002) (disaggregating process-based regulatory strate-
gies into “motive-based trust” in authorities and procedurally just administration of laws).  
 7. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE COOPERATE: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MOTIVATION 16–17 
(2011) (explaining why the emphasis shifted).  
 8.  Id. at 23–26, 34, 42–43 (Table 1 and subsequent discussions contrast rule adherence 
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constrain voluntary cooperation. Binding federal law (such as statutes 
and regulations) mandates behavior and can also preempt states 
from sharing in governance decisions, thereby constraining opportu-
nities for voluntary cooperation. Nonbinding federal policies in coop-
erative federalism power-sharing arrangements create the conditions 
for voluntary cooperation. This Article uses the example of duly en-
acted federal regulations on immigration detainers that give states 
and localities an option to cooperate with federal immigration enforce-
ment.9
Cooperation is foundational to society and therefore important to 
understand, explain, and cultivate.10 Richard Fallon identifies three 
forms of legitimacy that roughly correspond to Tyler’s motivations to 
cooperate: legal legitimacy, sociological legitimacy, and morality.11
Legality is motivated by instrumental concerns, such as seeking legal 
benefits or avoiding legal sanctions. Sociological acceptance is nor-
matively and procedurally motivated insofar as it reflects people’s be-
lief that the laws are fairly administered and that the authorities are 
trustworthy. Morality is motivated by substantive policy preferences. 
Importantly, the willingness to voluntarily cooperate with trustworthy 
authorities and fair procedures is a signal of perceived legitimacy ra-
ther than an incontrovertible claim. Unlike legality and morality, the 
sociological form of legitimacy rests on an internal definition. While it 
is difficult to maintain sharp distinctions between legitimacy, legality 
and morality in the presence of overlapping and mixed motivations,12
 9.  Some cooperative federalism definitions are more tightly constrained to instances 
where the federal government provides a block grant for states to administer in accordance with 
certain spending conditions or the federal government provides states and localities an opt-out 
with the understanding that the federal government will take over governance. My definition is 
more flexible and conforms to other scholars who invoke softer forms of cooperative federalism 
to study a broader array of power sharing agreements and policy contexts. Thanks to David 
Rubenstein for pointing out the distinction. 
 10.  The main emphasis is on procedural forms of legitimacy because they can overcome 
substantive policy preferences when sufficiently strong. See also TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY,
supra note 4, at 6, 170–73 (“theories of procedural justice suggest that people focus on court 
procedures, not on the outcomes of their experiences . . . if a judge treats them fairly . . . people 
will react positively to their experience, whether or not they receive a favorable outcome”); 
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE COOPERATE, supra note 7, at 18 (“The core argument is that while people 
are clearly motivated by self-interest and seek to maximize their material rewards and minimize 
their material deprivations, there is a rich set of other, more social motivations that additionally 
shape people’s actions.”). Other definitions of legitimacy include legality and moral or substan-
tive policy preferences. See, e.g., Richard Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 1787, 1794 (2005) (describing three concepts of legitimacy).  
 11.  Fallon, supra note 10, at 1794 (describing three concepts of legitimacy). 
 12.  See Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimacy in the Sociology of Law, 1983 WIS. L. REV.
379, 382 (1983) (Hyde considers these distinctions inextricable and expresses skepticism of 
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the concept of legitimacy in the sociological sense is analytically dis-
tinct and worthy of consideration in its own right. Perceptions of legit-
imacy, legality, and morality can simultaneously be present, even if 
legitimacy can also operate independently of internal assessments 
that the law is legally defensible and enforceable or normatively de-
sirable.13 Also, as Fallon points out, legality and legitimacy can inform 
and sometimes constitute one another. He writes, “Sociological ac-
ceptance is a necessary condition for a . . . legal system to exist at 
all,” and claims to a law’s legality can operate as signals of legitimacy 
and help to build the perception of the law’s legitimacy.14 Normative 
evaluations of a law’s morality or correspondence to one’s substan-
tive policy preferences might also constitute or influence the percep-
tion that a law is legitimate. 
Motivations for cooperation can be studied empirically. Observa-
ble indicia include attitudes of acceptance and cooperative behav-
iors.15 In terms of attitudes, the key criterion is the individual’s sense 
of obligation to cooperate with legal authority—not merely out of a 
sense of compulsion, but because of a belief in the legitimacy of the 
legal authority that issues laws. Numerous empirical studies influ-
enced by Tyler’s definition demonstrate that this form of legitimacy 
may be expressed as a belief in procedural justice—for example, if 
the legal authority was duly elected, the law duly enacted, or the im-
plementation fairly administered—or motive-based justice when an 
official is deemed trustworthy. However, few studies have examined 
self-interest). Fallon acknowledges the difficulty, but he maintains the possibility of disaggregat-
ing the three strands in a useful way. Cf. Fallon, supra note 10, at 1790–92 (“[L]aw does not 
rest on a single rock of legitimacy . . . but on sometimes shifting sands. Realistic discourse about 
constitutional legitimacy must reckon with the snarled interconnections among constitutional 
law, its diverse sociological foundations, and the felt imperatives of practical exigency and moral 
right.”). 
 13.  Tyler’s studies show that cooperative behavior is better explained by procedural justice 
and motive-based trust than instrumental variables such as punishments and rewards con-
nected with legality. This means that there is greater explanatory power for the variance in be-
havior. However, it does not deny that instrumental considerations such as legality influence 
behavior. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 4, at 6; TYLER, WHY PEOPLE COOPERATE, supra 
note 7, at 18. 
 14.  Fallon, supra note 10, at 1791 n.7. 
 15.  Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, In Search of Legitimacy: Toward an Empirical 
Analysis, 8 LAW & POL’Y 257, 259 (1986) (delineating attitudinal and behavioral dimensions of 
legitimacy). McEwen and Maiman caution scholars not to infer too much from acquiescence by 
itself without additional evidence that cooperative behavior is motivated by an affirmative belief 
in legitimacy. This sense of caution is important and accompanies the Article’s reliance on public 
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immigration enforcement.16 Survey-based studies of individuals’ atti-
tudes toward cooperation ask whether an individual feels it is okay to 
disobey a federal law; whether disobeying a law is sometimes justi-
fied; and what factors might cause someone to disobey.17 This quan-
titative research design is adapted for qualitative study in this Article. 
This Article adapts Tyler’s framework in another way. It shifts the 
unit of analysis from individual to institutional cooperation, using 
states’ decisions to cooperate or not cooperate with federal laws ra-
ther than the decisions of ordinary people. In doing so, this Article 
bridges the procedural justice, organizational compliance, and coop-
erative federalism literatures. Like individuals, public institutions de-
cide whether or not to cooperate with federal laws based partly on 
their perceptions of the legitimacy of the federal law or their belief in 
the federal authorities that issued it. The cross-sectional analysis of 
state motivations for adopting their detainer policies corresponds to 
individual motivations. As with individuals, some of the state motiva-
tions for cooperating with federal policies are instrumental or self-
serving ones—for example, obtaining funds from the federal govern-
ment for necessary state programs or avoiding legal sanctions in the 
form of fines or other liability. Other motivations to cooperate are 
driven by normative commitments, both to procedural and substantive 
ideals. A notion of procedural justice entails recognition of the federal 
government’s authority to issue commands or to fairly administer a 
program, notwithstanding independently held and sometimes con-
trary substantive policy preferences. Substantive policy concerns can 
complement these procedural grounds for accepting a federal policy. 
In immigration enforcement, public safety is key among them. Com-
munity solidarity is another, whether seen in community policing that 
relies on relationships between law enforcement and ordinary people 
 16.  Major studies of procedural justice have been conducted in policing in Tom Tyler, En-
hancing Police Legitimacy, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. SCI. & SOC. SCI. 84, 84 (2004); criminal 
law in TOM TYLER & JONATHAN JACKSON, Future Challenges in the Study of Legitimacy and 
Criminal Justice, in LEGITIMACY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 83, 83–84 (Justice Tankebe et al. eds., 
2013); and tax law in Marjorie E. Kornhauser, A Tax Morale Approach to Compliance: Recom-
mendations for the IRS, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 599, 602 (2007). One of the only scholars studying 
procedural justice and immigration enforcement is Emily Ryo. Emily Ryo, Less Enforcement, 
More Compliance, Rethinking Unauthorized Migration, 62 UCLA L. REV. 622, 622 (forthcoming 
2015); Emily Ryo, Deciding Whether to Cross: Norms and Economics of Unauthorized Migra-
tion, 78 AM. SOC. REV. 574, 574 (2013). See also Adam Cox & Thomas Miles, Legitimacy and 
Cooperation: Will Immigrants Cooperate with Local Police Who Enforce Immigration Law?
(Univ. of Chi. Working Paper No. 534, Sept. 9, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=2658265. 
 17.  See, e.g., Ryo, Norms and Economics, supra note 16, at 589 (survey instrument and 
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to report crimes, share information, and build a sense of community 
or civic engagement that calls on ordinary people to participate in civic 
channels and contribute resources of time, money, and commitment 
for the sake of the greater good. The state cooperation continuum 
models the decision-making process undertaken by individuals who 
translate their beliefs into behaviors and the policy outcomes that re-
sult. 
Admittedly, the correspondence between individual decision-
making and institutional decision-making is not perfect. It is not al-
ways clear who speaks for the state as a public actor when the state’s 
value preferences are internally divided.18 Moreover, elected officials 
(such as a governor or sheriff) face pressure to get re-elected and can 
use public statements strategically, rather than explaining their think-
ing in a straightforward manner.19 Yet the process-tracing analysis 
used in this Article emulates the methods commonly used for organi-
zational and public policy analysis20 and confirmatory evidence, such 
as stipulations in litigation and correspondence, and mitigates the lim-
itations of public statements as evidence of state decision-making. 
B. Uncooperative Federalism as Policymaking in Immigration 
Enforcement 
Studying institutional compliance and cooperative federalism to-
gether also yields the insight that the cooperation continuum extends 
 18.  Political scientists routinely confront this challenge when examining Congress. See, 
e.g., Kenneth Shepsle, Congress Is a They, Not an It: Legislative Intent as an Oxymoron, 12
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 241–42 (1992) (pointing out collective action problems in entities 
comprised of multiple actors and conditions of divided government). Legal scholars and judges 
encounter reliability problems when using legislative history as a guide to legislative intent as 
well, though the use of legislative history in courts and scholarship is as well established as it is 
contested. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 18–19, 23–24, 29–37
(1997) (critiquing reliance on legislative history for purposes of discerning legislative intent). Cf. 
Stephen G. Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L.
REV. 845, 863–64 (1992) (legislative history is a valuable guide to Congress’ intended meaning); 
Robert A. Katzman, Statutes, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 637, 653 (2012) (same).  
 19.  While important considerations, these obstacles are no more present in the study of 
state cooperation than when studying the political behavior of Congress. Granted state cooper-
ation with federal laws is complicated by doctrines of preemption in some instances. This Article 
focuses on arenas of shared governance as compared with arenas where the federal govern-
ment commands state compliance on the grounds of these doctrines. 
 20.  Andrew Bennett, Process Tracing and Causal Inference, in RETHINKING SOCIAL 
INQUIRY (Henry Brady & David Collier eds., 2d ed. 2010) (endorsing case study methods such 
as process tracing and within-case analysis as legitimate means of social scientific explanation 
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from willing embrace of federal policy and national standards21 to un-
cooperative behavior that can revise, reshape or reject national stand-
ards.22 By choosing to not cooperate with the federal policy, or by 
limiting participation, the state can weaken, slow, or redirect the fed-
eral mandate. In the context of immigration enforcement, where the 
federal government has increasingly enlisted state-local involvement, 
states and localities might resist a federal request to hold immigrants 
beyond their scheduled release for transfer to federal immigration 
custody by enacting state and local policies that independently govern 
detainer practices or by enacting executive orders or TRUST Acts that 
prohibit local cooperation under certain circumstances. And yet, in 
this Article, state resistance to federal detainer requests is not con-
sidered civil disobedience in a legal environment that makes cooper-
ation voluntary; it is part of a cooperation continuum.23
A corollary of cooperation and noncooperation at the local level—
borne of interaction and conversation between federal, state, and 
county officials—is policymaking.24 The dynamic of states and locali-
ties reaffirming, revising, or rejecting federal policy can be described 
 21.  A classic example of a statute embracing cooperative federalism is the Clean Air Act, 
which empowers California to set standards for the rest of the nation. Studies of over-compli-
ance have focused on business firms that exceed environmental regulations. See, e.g., Neil 
Gunningham et al., Social License and Environmental Protection: Why Businesses Go Beyond 
Compliance, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 307, 336 (2004). 
 22.  Uncooperative federalism is a variant of cooperative federalism. It is defined by Pro-
fessors Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken to include instances where states act as 
dissenters, rivals, and challengers from their position as insiders and partners in policymaking 
rather than passively acquiescing to federal policy or resisting as policymaking outsiders or 
sovereigns. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE 
L.J. 1256, 1281 (2009).  
 23.  While there has been scholarship describing the evolution of immigration detainers, 
few scholars have theorized detainer practices as a case study of voluntary cooperation. In-
stead, other scholars have studied voluntariness as a matter of detainer discretion. Anil Kalhan, 
Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and Pri-
vacy, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1106, 1160 (2013); Christopher Lasch, Rendition Resistance, 92 N.C. L.
REV. 149, 208–09 (2013); Juliet Stumpf, Devolving Discretion: Lessons from the Life and Times 
of Secure Communities, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1259, 1262 (2015). Those analyzing these exercises 
of discretion have often assumed a binary view of legal compliance that posits the kinds of state-
local resistance to detainer requests (or other sanctuary policies) as civil disobedience rather 
than a form of policymaking. Although I part ways with this conception, the binary formulation is 
especially understandable where, for many years, the federal government indicated that their 
requests were actually mandatory (rendering denials of those requests to be disobedient). 
 24.  In legal scholarship on cooperative federalism, common analogies for this form of pol-
icymaking are to a layered or marbled cake. Robert Schapiro calls this polyphonic federalism, 
emphasizing the possibility of blending state-federal power to produce a distinct form of govern-
ance. ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 7, 92 (2009). Environmental scholars such as Ann Carlson and Kirsten 
Engel speak of dynamic or iterative federalism. Ann Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate 
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in terms of policy learning or policy development.25 State cooperation 
with a federal policy can reinforce and strengthen immigration policy 
writ large. Noncooperation can undermine, disrupt, or displace it.26
Though it may seem counterintuitive, states acting uncooperatively 
serve as “servants and allies carrying out federal policy” just as they 
do when they act cooperatively.27 Their influence stems from states’ 
and localities’ integral role as the servants of national policy, the 
hands and feet executing and implementing the heart of federal poli-
cies, and their insider status. 
Uncooperative federalism . . . takes place in areas where states can 
take advantage of the connective ties that bind them to federal offi-
cials. While those ties may lead state officials to dissent in less 
forceful or radical terms [compared to those dissenting as outsid-
ers], they also yield knowledge of the system and personal relations 
with the people best positioned to change the policy. If effective 
dissent requires one to know both what to say and to whom to say 
it, uncooperative federalism ought to be fairly effective.28
In the current example, uncooperative federalism led to signifi-
cant reform of immigration law enforcement policy around immigration 
detainers. 
Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 161 (2006) (also describing cooperative 
federalism as runners passing a baton). Cf. Adam Cox, Enforcement Redundancy and the Fu-
ture of Immigration Law 32 (N.Y. Univ. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 394, 2013).
 25.  There is a parallel social science literature on policy learning, policy feedback, and 
policy diffusion that makes additional distinctions between vertical and horizontal diffusion, bot-
tom-up and top-down diffusion, and snowball, pressure valve, and spill-over policy dynamics 
difficult to distinguish. See generally PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS,
AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 17–53, 79–102 (2004); Frances Stokes Berry & William D. Berry, Innova-
tion and Diffusion Models in Policy Research, in THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS 365–66 
(Paul Sabatier & Christopher Wieble eds., 3d ed. 2014); Keith Boecklman, Influences of States 
on Federal Policy Adoption, 20 POL’Y STUD. J. 365 (1992); Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, 
Bottom Up Federalism, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 825, 826–29 (2006). On immigration policy specifi-
cally, see generally KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN & PRATHEEPAN GULASEKARAM, THE NEW 
IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM 6 (2015); Monica Varsanyi & Doris Marie Provine, Divergent States: 
Explaining Immigration Policy Trajectories in New Mexico and Arizona (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author); Graeme Boushey & Adam Luedtke, Immigrants Across the U.S. 
Federal Laboratory: Explaining State Level Innovation in Immigration Policy, 11 ST. POL. & POL’Y
Q. 390, 408 (2011); Laura B. Bozovic, Immigration Policy in the American States: An Event 
History Analysis of State Adoption and Diffusion of the Cooperative Immigration Enforcement 
287(g) Program (2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Alabama) (on file with 
University of Alabama Libraries, University of Alabama). 
 26.  Sovereignty-laden images of uncooperative federalism include one form of govern-
ment threatening the other, competitive versions where one crowds out the other, or other more 
conflicting versions in which states are viewed as “disobedient” or even renegade in its decision 
to not align with the federal government. In the sovereign realm, rather than servant realm, 
judicial doctrines such as preemption or anti-commandeering are sometimes necessary to me-
diate conflicts between state and federal exercises of power within shared zones of governance. 
 27.  Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 22, at 1258.  
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II. RISE AND FALL OF SECURE COMMUNITIES AS STATE 
NONCOOPERATION
In broad perspective, dissatisfaction with federal immigration law 
has led to the adoption of state laws that reshape the policy landscape 
in both inclusionary and exclusionary ways. First, state laws and pol-
icies in forty-nine of fifty states voluntarily provide driver’s licenses to 
undocumented immigrants who have obtained lawful presence des-
ignation from the federal government. An example of the lawfully pre-
sent would be the DACA recipients, colloquially known as the 
DREAMers. These policies further immigrant inclusion and extend the 
reach of the federal government’s underlying executive action.29
Second, elaborated in this Article, is the evolution of criminal im-
migration enforcement programs and specifically state and local re-
sistance to the federal government’s immigration detainer usage 
through the Secure Communities program. Over the last decade, fed-
eral immigration enforcement has adopted an enforcement strategy 
that focuses its limited resources on deporting “criminal aliens” who 
are high priorities for removal.30 Partnerships between federal immi-
gration authorities and LEAs have become an important part of immi-
gration enforcement.31 ICE touts Secure Communities’ use of 
immigration detainers in jails as a cornerstone of these partnerships.32
 29.  Chen, supra note 2. 
 30.  Jennifer Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR
138, 139 (2009); César García Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1457, 
1472–73 (2013); Julia Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign 
Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 369–70 (2006).  
 31.  Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, 
State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1819, 1849 (2011). 
More information about the 287(g) program that preceded Secure Communities and its impact 
on immigration enforcement is available. See MARC R. ROSENBLUM & WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R42057, INTERIOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: PROGRAMS TARGETING 
CRIMINAL ALIENS 40 (2012); RANDY CAPPS ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., DELEGATION AND
DIVERGENCE: A STUDY OF 287(G) STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 30 (2011). 
 32.  The use of immigration detainers predating and during Secure Communities can be 
traced through numerous government documents, some revealed retrospectively in conjunction 
with Congressional investigations and private litigation. See, e.g., Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Net-
work v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t Agency, 827 F. Supp. 2d 242, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(FOIA litigation resulting in revelation that ICE knew program was not voluntary despite contrary 
claims); U.S. IMMIGRATION. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, SECOND CONGRESSIONAL STATUS REPORT
COVERING THE FOURTH QUARTER FISCAL YEAR 2008 FOR SECURE COMMUNITIES: A
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN TO IDENTIFY AND REMOVE CRIMINAL ALIENS 1 (2008) (listing the required 
components of Secure Communities); November 2014 Secure Communities Memo, supra note 
1; Letter from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Zoe Lofgren, Chair-
woman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec. & Int’l Law (Sept. 7, 
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Since its origin, Secure Communities has been an information-shar-
ing program that enables federal immigration enforcement to screen 
the fingerprints of every individual arrested and held in custody so that 
they can be checked against immigration records. Federal immigra-
tion authorities use this information in their effort to greatly increase 
interior deportations. If ICE learns from the database search that 
LEAs have someone in custody whom there is reason to believe is 
subject to removal, the federal government can request that the jail 
detain, or “hold,” the person beyond his scheduled release until fed-
eral immigration authorities can take custody in order to commence 
further investigation or initiate removal proceedings. The 2008 pilot 
program for Secure Communities operated in just fourteen jurisdic-
tions. It expanded exponentially to reach 3,181 jurisdictions by 2013, 
with nearly one million detainers issued nationwide.33
A. Shifting from Compliance to Cooperation: Immigration De-
tainer Requests and the Voluntariness of State-Local Cooperation, 
2008 – 2010 
The first step in understanding immigration detainers as a case 
study of state noncooperation with federal immigration enforcement 
policy involves closely examining the implementation of Secure Com-
munities and the government’s shifting stance regarding local discre-
tion over the detainer decisions. Language in the Secure 
Communities’ detainer forms initially indicated that LEAs were re-
quired to obey federal requests.34 While it was initially unchallenged, 
responses to local efforts to “opt-out”). Christopher Lasch, Adam Cox, and other scholars pro-
vide summaries of this complicated history and explanations of critical documents, forms, and 
regulations. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 87, 
98 (2013) (“the mandatory nature of Secure Communities was not initially made public”); Chris-
topher Lasch, Enforcing the Limits of the Executive’s Authority to Issue Immigration Detainers,
35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 164, 173 (2008–09) (describing Santa Clara’s opt-out campaign and 
FOIA litigation that demonstrated “DHS’ failure to adhere to the enforcement priorities it claimed” 
and “significant confusion about whether local participation in Secure Communities was man-
datory or optional,” including the revelation that ICE officials had long known the program was 
not voluntary”); David Martin, Resolute Enforcement Is Not Just for Restrictionists, 30 J. L. &
POL. 411, 444 (2015); Steven J. Mulroy, “Hold” On: The Remarkably Resilient, Constitutionally 
Dubious 48-Hour Hold, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 815, 840 (2013); Stumpf, Devolving Discretion, 
supra note 23, at 1260; Stumpf, Crimmigration Crisis, supra note 30, at 391. 
 33.  See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OPERATIONS OF 
UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT’S SECURE COMMUNITIES 5 (2012), 
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIG_12-64_Mar12.pdf; Secure Communities: Acti-
vated Jurisdictions, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://ice.gov/secure-communities (last vis-
ited Sept. 21, 2015); Who Are the Targets of ICE Detainers?, TRAC REPORTS (Feb. 20, 2013), 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/310/.  
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this language led to criticism and challenges from localities and immi-
grants’ rights advocates who wanted to opt-out of the controversial 
program.35 In 2010, ICE began to issue conflicting statements about 
the voluntariness of these requests in response to numerous requests 
for clarification.36 In a 2010 briefing to the Congressional Hispanic 
Caucus, ICE officials stated, “local law enforcement are not mandated 
to honor a detainer.”37 Thereafter, ICE clarified in its detainer regula-
tions that Secure Communities is an “opt-in” program and cooperation 
and requests to detain were voluntary.38 In litigation following the 
 35.  David Martin points out that Secure Communities was initially implemented during a 
period when the undocumented population was growing and many states sought out tougher 
enforcement. As compared with the 287(g) task force agreements, Secure Communities was 
seen as a more flexible program with more safeguards against abuse. Martin, supra note 32, at 
443. Faced with changing conditions and concerns about implementation, Santa Clara County 
became one of the first to opt-out. See Letter from David Venturella, Assistant Dir., U.S. Immi-
gration & Customs Enf’t, to Miguel Marquez, Cty. Counsel, Cty. of Santa Clara (Sept. 27, 2010) 
(on file with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security). Sheriffs working in tandem with immi-
grants’ rights groups prompted clarification of their ability to opt-out of the program. If they could 
not opt-out, these communities claimed the program violated the Tenth Amendment’s Anti-Com-
mandeering Clause and could also expose local jurisdictions to liability for other violations. Peter 
Markowitz and attorneys from the ACLU described the blend of litigation, community advocacy, 
and political negotiation that led to the crystallization of these claims as originating from in-prison 
advocacy, to developing theories of statutory interpretation and substantive law (state and fed-
eral law) in briefs and demand letters to sheriff’s offices, to working with the media and commu-
nity organizers to build political support that could influence mayors and governors, and to 
litigation (threatened or actual). Symposium, CrImmigration: Crossing the Border Between 
Criminal Law and Immigration Law, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. (2015). See also Stumpf, Crimmigration 
Crisis, supra note 30, at 412; Stumpf, Devolving Discretion, supra note 23, at 1260.   
 36.  Many examples of the changing language on detainers are available. See Nat’l Day 
Laborer Org. Network, supra note 32, at 260; Memorandum from David Venturella, Assistant 
Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to the Cong. Hispanic Caucus (Oct. 28, 2010) (on file 
with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security). Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network v. U.S. Immi-
gration & Customs Enf’t Agency, 827 F. Supp. 2d 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), and other investigations 
into ICE inconsistencies about the mandatory or voluntary nature of program upended confusing 
statements from ICE in 2010 that communities could not opt-out. Subsequent revelations from 
the release of documents pursuant to FOIA showed DHS’ internal forms indicating that commu-
nities could opt-out. NDLON v. US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE), CTR.
CONST. RIGHTS, https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-do/our-cases/national-day-laborer-organ-
izing-network-ndlon-v-us-immigration-and-customs (last visited Sept. 21, 2015); Secure Com-
munities is Optional, Harris Says, UNCOVER THE TRUTH (Nov. 7, 2012), 
http://uncoverthetruth.org.  
 37.  Correspondence and investigations described in supra notes 32, 35-36.  
 38.  According to the Congressional Research Service, ICE detainer form I-247 has been 
revised three times since 2010 in response to controversy and litigation. KATE M. MANUAL,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42690, IMMIGRATION DETAINERS: LEGAL ISSUES 12 (2014). Examples 
of forms include Interim Policy Number 10074.1: Detainers, CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING,
http://cironline.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/ICEdetainerpolicy.PDF (last visited Sept. 21, 
2014) and Immigration Detainer – Notice of Action, TRAC, SYRACUSE UNIV.,
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/310/include/immigrant_detainer_form_12_2012_i-
247.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2014) (revised Form I-247). Even after these revisions and DHS 
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amended interpretation, ICE has revised its statements to say “[a] de-
tainer is the mechanism by which the Service requests that the de-
taining agency notify the Service . . .” of an alien whose immigration 
status is questionable.39
Although the premise of voluntary action was far from straightfor-
ward, it was critical. Once states and counties realized they were not 
legally compelled to honor detainer requests and that cooperation 
was a matter of choice, a patchwork of responses arose. Studying 
these responses is the second step in understanding detainers as a 
case study of noncooperation. 
B. State-Local Resistance to Secure Communities, 2011 – 2014 
As described in the background to the case study, the picture of 
state and local cooperation changed dramatically and fitfully. Notwith-
standing ICE’s repeated clarifications of its detainer policy from 2010-
2011, the number of federal requests for detainers initially remained 
high.40 Rather, resistance took root in isolated communities. However, 
beginning in late 2012, the number of states and counties resisting 
detainer requests, or setting conditions on their responses to federal 
requests, began to mount.41 According to the Catholic Legal Immigra-
tion Network, in 2013 and 2014 at least 259 localities (twenty-six cities 
and 233 counties) officially restricted the extent to which LEAs may 
hold individuals for transfer to ICE.42 The trend continued until No-
vember 2014, when the Secure Communities’ demise limited federal 
detainer requests.43 While the number of non-cooperating localities 
mandatory until Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cty. rearticulated they were indeed not manda-
tory. No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *3 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014).  
 39.  Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 641 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing 59 Fed. Reg. 42,407 
(Aug. 17, 1994)). Galarza indicates that its holding is in keeping with ICE’s previous litigation 
position in Vargas v. Swan, 854 F.2d 1028, 1030 (7th Cir. 1988). Id. at 642. 
 40.  ICE detainer requests peaked in 2011 and then decreased until 2012 when the drop 
off stabilized before becoming even steeper in 2013. See Number of ICE Detainers Drops by 
19 Percent, TRAC REPORTS (July 25, 2013), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/325/.  
 41.  Two good sources of information about state responses to ICE requests is the ILRC 
map, Immigration Enforcement, IMMIGRATION LEGAL RES. CTR., http://www.ilrc.org/enforcement 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2015), and the Catholic Immigrant Legal Network Report, States and Lo-
calities That Limit Compliance with ICE Detainer Requests, CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGRATION 
NETWORK (Oct. 2014), https://cliniclegal.org/resources/articles-clinic/states-and-localities-limit-
compliance-ice-detainer-requests-jan-2014 (listing states and counties that limited compliance 
with ICE detainers as of Oct. 2014). 
 42.  See CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGRATION NETWORK, supra note 41. 
 43.  This trend of declining detainers may accelerate with the November 2014 DHS guid-
ance that ends Secure Communities and limits the routine practice of requesting detainers to 
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was far from a majority, it constituted the snowball leading to the av-
alanche that disrupted detainer practices. Understanding the thought 
processes and diffusion of state and local policies that fueled this bot-
tom-up disruption is critical to understanding the conditions under 
which detainer policies evolved—and to what effect. 
To preview the findings, this Article contends that states and 
counties lack the motivation to cooperate with ICE detainer requests 
when they perceive reasons to doubt the procedural justice of immi-
gration detainers and when they mistrust the federal government, not 
only when they fear legal liability or possess contrary policy prefer-
ences. A theoretically-drawn sample of policy responses is examined 
from jurisdictions within Arizona, California, Florida, Nevada, Texas, 
and others with high immigrant populations and a range of substan-
tive policy preferences (immigration population and policy prefer-
ences are both factors found to influence policy development in other 
literature). First, the Article examines public justifications for adopting 
particular detainer policies in the form of legislative histories, execu-
tive agreements, and public speeches. A cross-sectional analysis of 
these rationales revealed in these policy documents illustrates the 
presence of legitimacy, legality, and morality motivations. While the 
relative strength of these motivations cannot be ascertained from the 
research design, legitimacy is a prominent motivation. Sometimes it 
operates independently, and other times it operates in tandem with 
legality and morality. This first set of findings speaks to the importance 
of addressing legitimacy as a component (or “input”) of cooperation. 
Second, narratives of state and local policy adoption illustrate how 
LEAs translate beliefs into behaviors. This second set of findings il-
lustrates variation in the extent of cooperation with federal law (an 
“output”), suggesting that cooperation runs along a continuum rather 
than functioning as a binary phenomenon. While the degree of coop-
eration cannot be predicted from the presence of a particular motiva-
tion, the narratives demonstrate the range of policy outcomes 
connected with various processes of institutional decision-making. 
It clarifies the voluntariness of complying with the detainer request under other circumstances. 
November 21 Secure Communities Memo, supra note 1. Also, TRAC reports that the overall 
number of federal detainer requests has declined by one-third. Immigration Detainers Decline 
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1. Attitudes/Motivations: Why States and Counties Do Not Co-
operate
A cross-sectional analysis of the public justifications for adopting 
detainer policies reveals the presence of multiple motivations for with-
holding cooperation. Recognizing legitimacy among them reveals the 
significance of DHS addressing more than the legality or morality of 
detainers in its federal immigration enforcement strategies. 
Figure 1 summarizing factors influencing cooperation with non-
binding federal policy 
Legality and Legal Threat
Mandatory/request - feelings of voluntariness in cooperation 
4th Amendment and jurisdictional liability for holding immigrant 
without probable cause 
Legitimacy
Acceptance of executive authority to issue Secure Communities, 
enter state-local partnerships 
Attitudes toward federal government’s handling of immigration     
enforcement
Morality and Substantive Preferences
Pro- or anti-immigrant climate 
Autonomous policy goals and institutional values 
 Public Safety (release of dangerous immigrants into the 
community following sentence) 
 Community trust and Solidarity 
Legitimacy
The narratives of states and counties withholding cooperation 
from Secure Communities signal the program’s loss of legitimacy. 
Consistent with Tom Tyler’s legitimacy research, states and counties 
overwhelmingly cited their lack of respect for and confidence in the 
federal government’s immigration enforcement efforts. This lack of re-
spect was based on skepticism about the trustworthiness of the fed-
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sense that the program was procedurally defective and being admin-
istered unfairly (for Tyler, citizens’ perception of being treated fairly).44
Secure Communities’ history was shrouded in mystery and mis-
steps that bred community mistrust from its inception. DHS imple-
mented its enforcement program in communities using a variety of 
strategies, shifting over time from the use of Memorandums of Under-
standing (MOUs) to other types of negotiated agreements, and then 
altering the substance of the agreements to focus on cooperation with 
detainer requests rather than access to LEA databases.45 These in-
consistent and changing practices generated confusion over the man-
datory or voluntary nature of local participation in federal immigration 
enforcement. Moreover, community advocacy within Santa Clara and 
other counties revealed misleading federal government statements 
about specific requirements for local participation, presumably in an 
effort to compel state cooperation with ICE detainer requests.46 These 
revelations precipitated more counties seeking to opt-out from de-
tainer requirements and calls for independent investigation of the pro-
gram.47 The resulting government, nonprofit, and investigative 
journalism reports show that DHS was not adhering to its stated aims 
of targeting criminal aliens through Secure Communities, with high 
numbers of detained immigrants having no serious criminal convic-
tion.48 The failure to tailor detainer requests to criminal convictions 
suggested ICE was using LEA as part of its general immigration en-
forcement effort, rather than adhering to its stated aims as a targeted 
program, and that it was compelling cooperation over community op-
position.49 Florida’s Miami-Dade County was one of several counties 
 44.  TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 4, at 4; TYLER & HUO, supra note 6, at 58–64.  
 45.  Specific accounts of DHS’ implementation of Secure Communities vary, but the basic 
facts and link between elusive policies and community confusion are recounted in multiple 
sources. See, e.g., Lasch, supra note 32, at 176; Cox & Miles, supra note 32, at 136 n.34; 
Martin, supra note 32, at 449. 
 46.  See also Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t Agency, 
827 F. Supp. 2d 242, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); UNCOVER THE TRUTH, http://uncoverthetruth.org/ 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2015). 
 47.  Id. See also supra note 32 (describing investigations). 
 48.  TRAC reported that only 14% of ICE detainers issued in FY 2012-2013 involved seri-
ous criminals and only 47% involved persons with criminal violations at all. Few ICE Detainers 
Target Serious Criminals, TRAC REPORTS (Sept. 17, 2013), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/re-
ports/330/. Some of those lacking criminal convictions nonetheless met high priority criteria by 
virtue of being recent entries or repeat re-reentries. 
 49.  AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MD., RESTORING TRUST: HOW IMMIGRATION DETAINERS IN 
MARYLAND UNDERMINE PUBLIC SAFETY THROUGH UNNECESSARY ENFORCEMENT 20 (2012); AARTI
KOHLI ET AL., UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY LAW SCH., SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS 1
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that emphasized concerns about “trust” as a factor in its decisions to 
not grant ICE holds.50 The “trust” issue looms large in the narratives 
of noncooperation, rendering it fitting that state laws restricting county 
cooperation were subsequently named as “TRUST” Acts (a double 
entendre referring to the lack of trust in the federal government and 
the state law’s purpose as rebuilding trust between LEAs and immi-
grant communities). 
Some of the non-cooperating localities cited the program’s dis-
proportionate treatment of immigrants without serious criminal con-
victions or longtime residents as reasons for declining detainer 
requests. Illustrations reported as evidence of disproportionality in-
cluded the use of detainers for pre-conviction holds, sometimes after 
the triggering charges had been dropped or bail had been paid; hold-
ing U.S. citizens, Legal Permanent Residents, or other long-time res-
idents with substantial community ties; and holding domestic violence 
victims and those with traffic stops that resulted in arrests for trivial 
reasons.51 Although these are legally valid grounds for removal un-
der the multifactor provisions in sections 212(a) and 237(a) of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act (INA), they challenged public 
perceptions of fairness and proportionality. Such harsh practices vio-
lated normative values of fairness and procedural justice both related 
and unrelated to violations of law. For example, Cook County, Illinois, 
premised its noncooperation on concerns that detention did not con-
stitute “fair and equitable treatment” of immigrants apart from its con-
cerns about legal violations or liability.52 
Legality
Although legality is intertwined with legitimacy in some cases, le-
gality concerns expressed as lawfulness, legal sanctions, or adher-
ence to legal norms are worthy of independent analysis as well. Other 
than the concerns over the mandatory versus voluntary nature of the 
COMMUNITIES, supra note 33. David Martin credits these “mistakes in implementation” with the 
substantial opposition that followed. Martin, supra note 32, at 449.  
 50.  See Memorandum from R.A. Cuevas, Jr., Cty. Att’y, Miami-Dade Cty., Fla., to Rebeca 
Sosa et al., Chairwoman, Bd. Cty. Comm’rs (Dec. 3, 2013) (on file with the County of Miami-
Dade, Florida).  
 51.  For a summary of the disproportionality argument, see Mark Noferi, Mandatory Deten-
tion for U.S. Crimes: The Noncitizen Presumption Dangerousness in DETENTION, RISK AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS (Robert Koulish et al. eds., 2014). 
 52.  Cook County, Ill., Ordinance 11-O-73 (Sept. 7, 2011); LENA GRABER, NAT’L
IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, ALL-IN-ONE-GUIDE TO DEFEATING ICE
HOLDS, APPENDIX IV: LETTERS FROM PUBLIC OFFICIALS OR ELECTED OFFICIALS ON IMMIGRATION 
DETAINERS 1–9 (2012); Jason Cade, Plea Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court,
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program, a prominent legal argument surrounding detainers was the 
concern that immigration detainers violated the Fourth Amendment, 
which limits the federal government’s power to conduct unreasonable 
searches and seizures.53 Holding an immigrant in custody beyond the 
time when he would otherwise be released—if he posted bail, if his 
charges were dispensed, or if he served his sentence— is compara-
ble to making a new arrest in violation of these requirements because 
LEAs generally lack the legal authority to make an arrest based on a 
purely civil immigration violation without probable cause or a warrant 
for criminal arrest.54 These limitations function as substantive protec-
tions against government intrusion on individual privacy. Another 
Fourth Amendment requirement is that the federal government show 
that it has probable cause and execute a warrant for arrest, interpos-
ing a magistrate judge to evaluate probable cause.55 The requirement 
promotes reliability by interposing an independent reviewer of proba-
ble cause and again checks government tyranny over individuals. 
In exercising their choice to cooperate with detainer requests that 
fall short of these requirements, some states and localities grappled 
with the Constitutionality of holding immigrants or prolonging deten-
tion beyond scheduled release. Some states and counties objected 
to immigration detainers outright, as a matter lacking legal authority.56
Others conditioned their response to stay within the bounds of legal 
authority. A Nevada sheriff said he was willing to hold immigrants pro-
vided that probable cause and a warrant existed, suggesting that his 
reluctance was not premised on the legality of holding immigrants for 
 53.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV (protects people against “unreasonable searches and sei-
zures” and requires that “no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause”).
 54.  See Morales v. Chadbourne, 996 F. Supp. 2d 19, 39 (D. R.I. 2014) (“Because the state 
court released Ms. Morales on bail, the RIDOC detention based on the ICE detainer constitutes 
a ‘new seizure’ and must meet all of the Fourth Amendment requirements.”); see also Miranda-
Olivares v. Clackamas Cty., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *9, *11 (D. Or. Apr. 
11, 2014) (“The seizures that allegedly violated her Fourth Amendment rights were not a con-
tinuation of her initial arrest, but new seizures independent of the initial finding of probable cause 
for violating state law . . . . Thus, the Fourth Amendment applies to County’s detention of Mi-
randa–Olivares after she was entitled to pre-trial release on bail and again after she was entitled 
to release after resolution of her state charges.”). 
 55.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 56.  Before enacting a TRUST Act in 2013, California passed a state law that would have 
barred the state from detaining individuals on behalf of ICE under nearly all circumstances, even 
if they were charged or convicted of a significant crime. Governor Brown vetoed this more ex-
pansive version of the law. Recent Legislation: Immigration Law — Criminal Justice and Immi-
gration Enforcement — California Limits Local Entities’ Compliance with ICE Detainer Requests 
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ICE per se, but on the strength of the legal claim for holding the im-
migrant in a particular manner.57 In a similar spirit, some counties limit 
the holding period to 48 hours rather than an indefinite time until ICE 
takes custody, or enact other conditions.58
Legitimacy research tells us that the loss of sociological ac-
ceptance imperils other forms of legitimacy as well. This intertwining 
relationship between legitimacy and legality explains why the general 
concern for fairness or procedural justice can also be articulated in 
terms of legal argument. In Miranda-Olivares, a federal court declared 
that detainers were not mandatory and that a state or county could be 
held liable under the Fourth Amendment.59 The judicial reasoning 
shows that the fear of liability is certainly related to a loss of legitimacy 
and that in instances where a course of action has been ruled uncon-
stitutional (or in grave constitutional doubt) there may be a near total 
loss of legitimacy. While such a ruling functionally eliminated the 
LEAs’ choice to cooperate, the LEAs’ noncooperation was neither au-
tomatic nor immediate. The legal losses engendered a loss in legiti-
macy once the laws encompassed values of fairness that matter 
independently of liability. The laws constituted legitimacy. It is in this 
same sense that Richard Fallon tells us that laws depend much more 
on their present sociological acceptance than upon the legality of their 
formal ratification in a legal system that utilizes stare decisis.60
Still while constitutional litigation brings the two concepts closer 
together, they are not always coextensive. Sometimes legitimacy can 
be separated from legality where litigation and legal threat are pre-
sent. Within weeks of the Miranda-Olivares decision, fifty sheriffs in 
Oregon voluntarily announced that they would no longer hold people 
based on ICE detainers because of the risk of liability.61 Two counties 
in Nevada (Washoe County and Reno) and South Tucson, Arizona 
 57.  See Paul Johnson, Nevada Sheriff Vows to No Longer Hold Illegal Immigrants Without 
Warrant, SANCTUARY CITIES INFO (July 16, 2014), http://sanctuarycities.info/sanctu-
ary_state_nevada.htm. The governor of Maryland similarly issued a memo limiting Maryland’s 
compliance with ICE detainers unless “the requests have adequate support for a finding of prob-
able cause under the Fourth Amendment.” Letter from Martin O’Malley, Governor, St. of Md., to 
Gregg Hershberger, Sec’y, Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Correctional Servs. (Aug. 27, 2014) (on file 
with the State of Maryland). More litigation supporting the probable cause requirement is emerg-
ing, although the requirement for a warrant remains unsettled. 
 58.  See infra notes 100–04.
 59.  Miranda-Olivares, 2014 WL 1414305, at *8. 
 60.  Fallon, supra note 10, at 1790–92.  
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changed their practices pursuant to a legal settlement.62 These and 
other counties specifically cited the threat of being held liable for an 
unlawful detention request given that the prolonged detention itself 
would result from the state or localities’ voluntary action rather than a 
changed perception of legitimacy.63 The fear of liability in these cases 
is an instrumental justification for cooperation distinct from general 
due process or legitimacy concerns. 
Morality and Substantive Policy Preferences
Concerns about the use of immigration detainers also manifested 
in reports about the program’s morality insofar as it meets independ-
ent standards of policy soundness or fits with a state or counties’ sub-
stantive values. These substantive values may either confirm or 
contradict procedural values; they are distinguishable from partisan-
ship or politics.64 Some of the most common substantive policy con-
cerns associated with detainers included: effectiveness of the 
program, unintended consequences of the program, and costs asso-
ciated with cooperation. 
Many counties questioned the effectiveness of detainers as a 
measure of public safety or crime control. Some critics noted discrep-
ancies between the program’s stated priorities and targeted out-
comes. For example, using public data, Santa Clara County, 
California and other counties seeking to opt-out cited statistics show-
ing that 79% of those detained pursuant to Secure Communities had 
never been convicted of a serious or violent offense despite the pro-
gram’s ostensible focus on criminal aliens65 and other reports focused 
 62.  Press Release, Washoe Cty. Sheriff’s Office, Sheriff Haley Announces the Washoe 
County Detention Facility Will No Longer Accept ICE Detainers (Sept. 10, 2014) (on file with the 
Washoe County Sheriff’s Office). The Washoe County, Nevada Sheriff stated that he “took a 
serious look at the recent court rulings” and revised their policy to protect the county from legal 
liability for violations of constitutional rights. Id. Note: The adoption of policy due to legal threat 
suggests involuntary cooperation rather than voluntary cooperation. 
 63.  See, e.g., Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 645 (3d Cir. 2014) (court found county 
could be civilly liable for unlawfully detaining immigrant for ICE because it was not required to 
comply and instead chose to do so). See also Miranda-Olivares, 2014 WL 1414305, at *11.  
 64.  Partisanship relates to the influence of political conditions and electoral incentives. 
While its effect on immigration enforcement policies is established in empirical studies, it should 
not be confused with the concepts of substantive policy or morality used in this Article. See, 
e.g., Daniel Chand & William Schreckhise, Secure Communities and Community Values: Local 
Context and Discretionary Immigration Enforcement, 41 J. ETHNIC STUD. 1621, 1635 (2015); 
Karthick Ramakrishnan & Tom Wong, Partisanship Not Spanish, in TAKING LOCAL CONTROL:
IMMIGRATION POLICY ACTIVISM IN U.S. CITIES AND STATES. 1, 1 (Monica W. Varsanyi ed., 2010). 
 65.  Letter from Miguel Marquez, Cty. Counsel, Cty. of Santa Clara, to George Shirakawa 
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on trivial offenses such as a traffic stop triggering arrest for driving 
without a license or the non-offense of being the victim of domestic 
violence.66 Scholarly studies suggest a weak link between the activa-
tion of Secure Communities and crime control.67 New York City offi-
cials expressed concerns about the criminal justice system becoming 
overburdened and diverted from its primary mission of law enforce-
ment.68 A Warren Center report indicated that Latinos are overrepre-
sented in the Secure Communities program relative to their actual 
crime rates, despite the government’s insistence that finger printing 
guards against racial profiling.69
Although an unintended consequence of detention, an Immigra-
tion Policy Report into Travis County, Texas revealed that detainers 
impede access to liberty on bail and lead to inadequate trial prepara-
tion and impeded attorney access.70 Other undesirable yet unin-
tended consequences include erosion of community trust and 
undermining the community policing relationships integral to public 
safety.71 Contrary to these estimations, Texas’ Harris County viewed 
ICE’s presence in jails and its requests for detainers as a prophylactic 
device that could reduce public safety risks by avoiding the release of 
criminal aliens and grants ICE holds at high rates.72
Clara); see also Cox & Miles, supra note 32, at 89 (using empirical analysis to discount crime 
prevention as the primary motivation for Secure Communities rollout, despite putative purpose 
of preventing crime and removing criminal aliens). Cox, Miles, and many others accuse the 
federal government of using Secure Communities as a strategy to bolster immigration enforce-
ment generally rather than accomplishing other stated objectives. Id.
 66.  Ginger Thompson & Sarah Cohen, More Deportations Follow Minor Crimes, Report 
Shows, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2014) (reporting on independent investigation of ICE records). 
 67.  Cox & Miles, supra note 32, at 89 (using empirical analysis to demonstrate that high-
crime areas were not a priority in Secure Communities rollout). 
 68.  Jason Cade, Plea Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1751, 1776–77 (2013) (discussing impact of detainers on criminal justice systems). 
 69.  KOHLI ET AL., supra note 49, at 6. 
 70.  Andrea Guttin, The Criminal Alien Program: Immigration Enforcement in Travis 
County, Texas, IMMIGRATION POL. CTR. (Feb. 2010), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/special-
reports/criminal-alien-program-immigration-enforcement-travis-county-texas. 
 71.  See, e.g., Memorandum from R.A. Cuevas, Jr., Cty. Att’y, Miami-Dade Cty., Fla., to 
Rebeca Sosa et al., Chairwoman, Bd. Cty. Comm’rs (Dec. 3, 2013) (on file with the County of 
Miami-Dade, Florida). Florida’s Miami-Dade County adopted a binding resolution of limited com-
pliance in 2013, citing that blanket compliance, among other factors, could undermine public 
safety and trust between immigrants and police in the community. Id.
 72.  Lomi Kriel, Immigration Screening Still Used in Texas as Other Agencies Withdraw,
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Distinct from morality, substantive concerns about the cost to jails 
of prolonging detention without reimbursement of housing and admin-
istrative costs from the federal government were raised by those who 
cooperated and those who did not. California frequently cited these 
costs and sought reimbursement from the federal government 
through its TRUST Act.73 The Longview News Journal and Texas
Tribune published detention costs in its newspaper, even though the 
cost considerations have not changed the states’ practices.74 Again, 
Harris County houses more than 30,000 undocumented immigrants 
at a cost of more than $49.6 million—the highest costs of 245 jails 
statewide and among the highest detainer rates in the country—and 
yet it continues to issue ICE holds.75 A state law requires the cost 
tracking for the sake of facilitating federal reimbursement, consistent 
with a vision of federal-local partnerships in immigration enforce-
ment.76
Some of the substantive policy concerns overlap legitimacy con-
cerns. For example, the specter of the federal government imposing 
on county jails without reimbursing associated costs or imposing on 
individuals without respecting Fourth Amendment liberties could raise 
constitutional concerns or legal liability. The illegitimacy of a law en-
forcement operation motivated by racial profiling or unable to stick to 
its stated enforcement priorities could raise substantive moral con-
cerns as well as procedural ones. Tom Tyler and Yuen Huo report on 
ethnic minorities’ special experiences with law enforcement, suggest-
ing that it is harder to overcome long histories of motive-based mis-
trust and ineffectiveness of crime reduction in minority communities.77
 73.  Judith A. Greene, The Cost of Responding to Immigrant Detainers in California, NAT’L
IMMIGRATION JUST. CTR. (Aug. 22, 2012), https://immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjus-
tice.org/files/Justicestrategies—Cost%20of%20Responding%20to%20detain-
ers%20in%20CA.pdf (estimating cost to LA County of $113 per day). 
 74.  Sarah Thomas, Officials Grapple with Costs of Jailing Undocumented Immigrants,
LONGVIEW NEWS J. (Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.news-journal.com/news/2013/oct/16/officials-
grapple-with-costs-of-jailing-undocument; Edgar Walters & Dan Hill, Texas Jails Housed Fewer 
Immigrants in 2013, TEX. TRIB. (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.texastribune.org/2014/03/04/texas-
jails-house-fewer-undocumented-immigrants. 
 75.  Id. Harris County spokespersons qualified these cost estimates by noting that some 
costs would have been borne for the underlying conviction apart from the ICE hold and that 
others are reimbursed through the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program. Id.
 76.  Id. (noting that “Senate Bill 1698 requires jails to track the number of inmates held on 
federal detainers along with the number of days those prisoners are housed and how much the 
county pays to hold them”). 
 77. TYLER & HUO, supra note 6 at, 141–52; David Kirk et al., The Paradox of Law Enforce-
ment in Immigration Communities: Does Tough Immigration Enforcement Undermine Public 
Safety, 641 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. SCI. & SOC. SCI. 79 (2012) (recent trends toward strict local 
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Partisanship-motivated allegiance to a pro-immigration enforcement 
or anti-federal intrusion policy position could also enter the equation. 
However, some of the legitimacy research defines the motivation to 
cooperate on the basis of trustworthiness despite contrary substan-
tive preferences. Least of all in these cases, policy concerns can be 
voiced independent of perceptions of legitimacy or legality. 
2. Behaviors: Cooperation-Noncooperation Continuum 
The remainder of Part II provides narratives of policy adoption, 
specifically tracing how states and localities came to their detainer 
policies and to what effect. The case studies show that noncoopera-
tive behavior is the product of institutional decision-making that trans-
lates beliefs into behaviors. The case studies showcase variation in 
the degree of cooperation that can be displayed along a continuum. 
Figure 2 Spectrum of State Noncooperation with Detainers
        Noncooperation                         Limiting/ Resistance              Cooperation 
        (California, Cook County, IL)              (Oregon, MN, NV)              (Texas, Arizona) 
States and Counties Withholding Cooperation
As relayed in the cross-sectional analysis of detainer practice, 
many of the counties who declined to honor detainer requests did so 
through the elimination or curtailment of their own discretion over de-
tainers. Cook County, Illinois serves as an illustrative example. Cook 
County has contested federal immigration enforcement going back to 
Chicago’s self-declaration as a sanctuary city in 2006.78 Facing ques-
tionable threats from the federal government that it would cut off re-
imbursement of costs for LEA cooperation with the State Criminal 
Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP) unless Cook County cooperated 
with its detainer requests, Cook County nevertheless held its 
the law in immigrant communities); Rodolfo D. Saenz, Another Sort of Wall-Building: How Crim-
migration Affects Latino Perceptions of Immigration Law, 28 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 477 (2013) (un-
derstanding Latino perceptions of immigration policies is crucial to encouraging more adherence 
to immigration law and fostering a sense of belonging to U.S. society).
 78.  Cade, supra note 68, at 1817 nn. 364–65 (describing Cook County policies); see also
Letters exchanged between Toni Preckwinkle, Pres., Cook Cty. Bd. & John Morton, Dir., U.S. 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Jan. 4, 2012–Apr. 9, 2012) (on file with the U.S. Department of Home-
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stance.79 Cook County passed an ordinance in 2011, seeking to opt-
out rather than cooperate with ICE detainers.80 The broad refusal re-
flected all three concerns: legality, legitimacy, and contrary substan-
tive policy. In 2012, the Director of DHS, John Morton, sent a letter to 
the President of the Cook County Board of Commissioners to “ex-
press my serious concerns with the Ordinance,” claiming that it hin-
ders ICE’s ability to enforce the nation’s immigration laws”81 and that 
it violates INA section 1373(a), which provides that a “local govern-
ment entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any gov-
ernment entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, [ICE] 
information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or 
unlawful, of any individual.”82 The President of the Cook County 
Board of Commissioners, Toni Preckwinkle, defended the legality of 
its local ordinance with a series of letters explaining that she doubted 
the federal government’s authority to compel Cook County’s cooper-
ation. Preckwinkle pointed out that the portion of the law that John 
Morton cited was preceded by the phrase, “Notwithstanding any other 
provision of Federal, State, or local law.”83 Cook County’s local law 
“outlines limitations for utilizing County staff and resources to respond 
to ICE inquiries,”84 thus limiting rather than expanding ICE’s detainer 
policy. The president of Cook County’s Board also challenged the ICE 
detainers because they violate norms of procedural fairness and pol-
icy soundness. The policies treat people unequally based on their im-
migration status. ICE agents may access detainees if they have a 
criminal warrant unrelated to the detainee’s immigration status, but 
the proper way to address public safety is to detain individuals using 
proper procedures related to their immigration status.85 The presi-
dent reiterated that the Cook County Ordinance “was passed to en-
sure that detainees in Cook County are granted fair and equitable 
 79.  SCAAP provides federal payments to states and localities that incur costs for impris-
oning undocumented aliens with criminal convictions for at least four consecutive days during 
the reporting period. The DOJ and DHS administer the program. U.S. BUREAU OF JUST.
ASSISTANCE, F.Y. 2013 SCAAP GUIDELINES AND APPLICATION (2013).  
 80.  Cook County, Ill., Ordinance 11-O-73 (Sept. 7, 2011).  
 81.  Letter from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Toni Preckwinkle, Pres., 
Cook Cty. Bd. (Jan. 4, 2012) (on file with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security). 
 82.  Id.
 83.  Letter from Toni Preckwinkle, Pres., Cook Cty. Bd., to John Morton, Dir., U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec. (Jan. 19, 2012) (on file with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security) (de-
fending policy of noncooperation against ICE Director Morton’s efforts to terminate it).  
 84.  Id.
 85.  Letter from John Morton to Toni Preckwinkle, supra note 81; Letter from Toni Preck-
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access to justice, regardless of their immigration status.”86 Cook 
County also supported its ordinance on legitimacy and morality 
grounds in the media.87 
Another way to withhold cooperation is for the state to eliminate 
local discretion over detainers. The states of California, Connecticut, 
Illinois, Rhode Island, and Washington, D.C. enacted state legislation 
restricting cooperation under certain circumstances for reasons that 
mix legitimacy and morality.  Each state prohibited county cooperation 
with certain detainer requests, rather than leaving it solely up to the 
counties to come up with their own policies and practices.  In 2013, 
California enacted legislation restricting LEAs from cooperating with 
ICE detainer requests unless an individual committed a serious of-
fense (defined as a violent felony) that would render him a high priority 
for immigration enforcement.88 California counties responded in a va-
riety of ways, although the TRUST Act requirements became its legal 
foundation for cooperation.89 The Governor’s endorsements of the 
legislation reveal that California also acted upon its perceived lack of 
federal legitimacy for the Secure Communities program.90 When the 
Trust Act got to Governor Brown’s desk, he signed it proudly and said: 
“While Washington waffles on immigration,” he said, “California’s forg-
ing ahead.”91 Several policy justifications comport with California’s 
“package” pro-immigrant inclusion positions on a bundle of issues ex-
tending beyond enforcement, including the belief that immigration sta-
tus is irrelevant to the general applicability of state law or the sense 
of belonging as a de facto state citizen.92 Illinois Governor Pat Quinn 
 86.  Id.
 87.  Kari Lyderson, Documents Reveal Pressure to Comply with Program to Deport Immi-
grants, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/27/us/27cncimmigra-
tion.html?_r=0 (explaining Cook County view that Secure Communities violates spirit of 
sanctuary ordinance). 
 88.  See Assemb. B. 4, 2013-2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).  
 89.  San Francisco complied with the Act by maintaining its own, stricter, countywide stand-
ards. San Bernardino County’s Sheriff John McMahon, who opposed the Trust Act, declared 
his intention to “enact the letter of the new state law without endangering the spirit of federal 
law.” Kern County Sheriff Donny Youngblood also vowed to defy the Trust Act. Recent Legisla-
tion, supra note 56, at 2595. 
 90.  Patrick McGreevy, Gov. Brown Signs Another Bill Easing Conditions for Immigrants,
L.A. TIMES: L.A. NOW (Oct. 5, 2013, 11:20 AM), http://stoptheicemonster.org/victory-gov-brown-
signs-the-trust-act/. 
 91.  Id.
 92.  See Assemb. B. 4, 2013-2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013). See generally Karthick 
Ramakrishnan & Allan Colbern, The California Package of Immigrant Integration and the Evolv-
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took a similarly bold stance in his executive order broadly forbidding 
cooperation with immigration detainer requests.93
States and Counties Conditioning Their Cooperation
Other jurisdictions have adopted a more measured approach to-
ward cooperation, ironically one with discernible impact on federal as 
well as local detainer practice. Rather than enacting blanket prohibi-
tions on cooperation, judicial challenges have clarified the scope of 
their obligations to cooperate with detainer requests. In Miranda-Oli-
vares v. Clackamas County, an immigrant charged with domestic vi-
olence challenged her detention for 19 hours beyond resolution of the 
dispute against the county’s defense that “federal law requires this 
custom and practice because ICE detainers (Form I-247) are issued 
pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 287.7 which . . . mandates the detention of a 
suspected alien by [an LEA] for up to 48 hours.”94 The court sided with 
the detainee, emphasizing that the additional holding period consti-
tuted a new seizure without a new warrant.95 The court pointed out 
that no federal circuit court had interpreted ICE detainers as anything 
but a request.96 Following the decision, ICE spokesmen Barbara Gon-
zalez said the agency would continue to work “cooperatively” with Or-
egon law enforcement.97 Still, Oregon dramatically limited its use of 
detainers thereafter. 
More than 250 localities nationwide have voluntarily or involun-
tarily limited their cooperation with federal detainer requests via policy 
or informal practice since Miranda-Olivares and other litigation setting 
boundaries around their permissible scope.98 For example, Colorado 
 93.  ILL. EXEC. DEP’T., EXECUTIVE ORDER ESTABLISHING GOVERNOR’S NEW AMERICANS 
TRUST INITIATIVE (2015). 
 94.   Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cty., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *3 
(D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014) (emphasis added). The court further noted that the county’s continuation 
of detention based on the ICE detainer constituted new, “prolonged warrantless, post-arrest, 
pre-arraignment custody.” Id. at *9 (quoting Pierce v. Multnomah Cty., 76 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th 
Cir. 1996)). 
 95.  Id.
 96.  Id. at *7 (citing Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 643 (3d Cir. 2014)). 
 97.  Julia Preston, Sheriffs Limit Detention of Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/19/us/politics/sheriffs-limit-detention-of-immi-
grants.html?_r=1.  
 98.  Amanda Peterson Beadle, Why 250 Counties Have Stopped Honoring ICE Detainers,
IMMIGRATION IMPACT (Sept. 22, 2014), http://immigrationimpact.com/2014/09/22why-250-coun-
tries-have-stopped-honoring-local-ice-detainers. See also Recent Developments on ICE Holds 
in Oregon, IMMIGRATION LAW GRP. (May 20, 2014), http://www.ilgrp.com/iceholds (listing of 250 
counties that limit compliance as of Sept. 2014); Immigration Enforcement, IMMIGRATION LEGAL
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has no statewide detainer prohibition policy and yet sheriffs in every
county have voluntarily limited detainer cooperation through changed 
practices and policies.99 Some of these limitations include refusing to 
go beyond the 48-hour ICE requested hold,100 defining serious crimes 
that qualify for a hold (e.g., violent crimes, violent felonies, gang mem-
bers),101 requiring probable cause or a criminal warrant for non-immi-
gration related criminal offenses,102 and seeking reimbursement for 
detention-related costs.103 These conditions for cooperation become 
the basis for revised detainer policy and practices. 
 99.  Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, All Colorado Jails Now Reject Federal Immi-
gration Detainers (Sept. 18, 2014) (on file with the American Civil Liberties Union). See also 
Letter from Am. Civil Liberties Union to the Colorado Sheriffs (Apr. 29, 2014) (on file with the 
American Civil Liberties Union) (calling into question legal authority to detain people for up to 6 
days at ICE’s request); Maha Kamal, The Latest Information on ICE Detainer Policies in Colo-
rado, MEYER LAW OFFICE, P.C., http://themeyerlawoffice.com/ice-detainers/ (last visited Sept. 
23, 2015); Kiela Parks, Is Your County Sheriff Still Honoring Detainer Requests from Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement?, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF COLO. (May 8, 2014), http://aclu-
co.org/blog/map-ice-detainers (displaying map of Colorado counties no longer honoring ICE 
detainer requests). 
 100.  Boulder County, Los Angeles County, Santa Clara County, San Francisco County, 
Connecticut TRUST Act, and the Rhode Island Governor’s Executive Order limit holds to 48-
hours or less. See S.F., Cal., Ordinance No. 204-13 (amendments to Chapter 121 of the Ad-
ministrative Code) (Sept. 24, 2013); Connecticut TRUST Act, H.R. 6659, 2014 Gen. Assemb., 
(Conn. 2014); BOULDER COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE JAIL DIVISION, NO. J933: POLICY ON ICE
HOLDS (May 21, 2014); SANTA CLARA COUNTY BOARD POLICY MANUAL 3.54 (2011); Letter from 
Lincoln D. Chafee, Governor, R.I., to Ashbel T. Wall, Dir., R.I. Dep’t of Corrections, Ordering 
Implementation of ICE Detainer Policy (July 17, 2014) (on file with the Rhode Island Immigration 
Legal Resource Center); Letter from John Scott, L.A. Cty. Sheriff, to Am. Civil Liberties Union, 
Describing Detainer Policy (June 26, 2014). 
 101.  Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Santa Clara, the California TRUST Act and the 
Connecticut TRUST Act define ICE’s serious offenses as recent convictions for violent felonies. 
Chi., Ill., Ordinance No. 2-173 (amendment to Title 2-713 of the Municipal Code) (July 25, 2012); 
Letter from John Scott to Am. Civil Liberties Union, supra note 100; S.F., Cal., Ordinance No. 
204-13 (amendments to Chapter 121 of administrative code) (Sept. 24, 2013); SANTA CLARA 
POLICY MANUAL, supra note 100; California TRUST Act, Assemb. B. 4 (Oct. 5, 2013); H.R. 6659, 
supra note 100.  
 102.  A probable cause finding by a magistrate judge is required by San Francisco County 
and Clackamas County, Oregon. S.F., Cal., Ordinance No. 204-13 (amendments to Chapter 
121 of the Administrative Code) (Sept. 24, 2013); Letter from Craig Roberts, Sheriff, Clackamas 
Cty., Suspending Placement of I-247 Immigration Detainers (Apr. 16, 2014) (on file at 
http://www.clackamas.us/sheriff/images/2014-04-16-SheriffRobertsLetterOnCourtDeci-
sion.pdf). A criminal warrant is required by Governor’s orders in Illinois and Rhode Island. Ill. 
Exec. Ord. No. 15-02 (Jan. 5, 2015); Letter from Lincoln D. Chafee to Ashbel T. Wall, supra 
note 100. County policies in Los Angeles County, Santa Clara County, Cook County, Illinois 
(including City of Chicago), and Boulder County also require warrants. H.R. 6659, supra note 
100; Chi., Ill., Ordinance No. 2-173 (amendment to Title 2-713 of the Municipal Code) (July 25, 
2012); Cook County, Ill., Ordinance 11-O-73 (Sept. 7, 2011); SANTA CLARA POLICY MANUAL,
supra note 100; BOULDER COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, supra note 100; Letter from John Scott to 
Am. Civil Liberties Union, supra note 100. 
 103.  Cook County, Illinois, Santa Clara County, and San Francisco County require federal 
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State Cooperation
LEAs can also cooperate with ICE holds, either de facto or by 
policy design granting ICE detainers.104 Texas is an example of a 
state in which all counties cooperate with ICE detainer requests on 
the basis of de facto, local decisions (despite internal dissent in the 
county housing Austin, a liberal outpost).105 While the counties 
acknowledge that they are not required to obey under federal law, 
they justify their choices to honor detainer requests because they fun-
damentally endorse the vision of shared federal-state-local immigra-
tion enforcement authority. Many Texan sheriffs believe the state has 
an important role to play in detaining undocumented citizens and also 
that the federal government should remain involved.106 This balancing 
of state-federal interests is reflected in the issue of payment of costs 
associated with detainers, which are tallied pursuant to a state bill that 
requires jails to track these costs as a means of prompting the federal 
government to reimburse local governments for those costs.107 The 
Texas Tribune and Longview News Journal published a comprehen-
sive list of the costs associated with keeping undocumented immi-
grants behind bars, but Texas did not use the cost counting as a 
reason to opt out of honoring detainers. Instead, it counted costs to 
increase federal accountability for the fiscal effects of detainers, not 
to rewrite those policies.108 To the extent that the high cost of housing 
204-13 (amendments to Chapter 121 of the Administrative Code) (Sept. 24, 2013); SANTA 
CLARA POLICY MANUAL, supra note 100. 
 104.  Prior to Secure Communities, the federal government relied on 287(g) agreements that 
empowered state and local law enforcement to directly enforce federal immigration law. Those 
agreements fell into disfavor after the 2012 Supreme Court decision in Arizona v. United States,
and were significantly defunded in the 2013 appropriations. 
 105.  See States and Localities That Limit Compliance with ICE Detainer Requests,
CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGRATION NETWORK (Oct. 2014), https://cliniclegal.org/resources/articles-
clinic/states-and-localities-limit-compliance-ice-detainer-requests-jan-2014 (listing states and 
counties that limited compliance with ICE detainers as of Oct. 2014). In response to the question 
“How many sheriff’s offices in Texas do not participate in this program?” the Sheriff’s Office 
stated that it is “not aware of any Texas Sheriff who has decided that they will no longer honor 
federal detainers or not send in fingerprints in accordance with the law.” ICE Detainers FAQs,
TRAVIS CTY. SHERIFF’S OFFICE, https://www.tcsheriff.org/inmate-jail-info/ice-detainers-faqs (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2015).   
 106.  As an example, a spokesperson for the Harris County Sheriff’s office described the 
local practice of immigration detainers by saying: “At large, urban jails like Harris County’s, ICE 
picks up Monday through Friday.” Edgar Walters & Dan Hill, Texas Jails Housed Fewer Immi-
grants in 2013, TEX. TRIB. (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.texastribune.org/2014/03/04/texas-jails-
house-fewer-undocumented-immigrants.
 107.  S.B. 1698, 82d Leg. (Tex. 2011). 
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immigrants beyond their anticipated stay was a concern, it was out-
weighed by Texas’ belief in the legitimacy of the state-federal enforce-
ment arrangement. 
Apart from cost, Texan counties support the policy soundness of 
LEAs issuing immigration detainers—a convergence of local and fed-
eral policy that makes cooperation easier—especially due to their 
strong concerns for border control and public safety risks presented 
by criminal aliens. As one conservative immigration organization 
pointed out: 
 Enforcement opponents argue that localities could save money 
by refusing to comply with ICE detainers. Many Texas sheriffs dis-
agree, citing the potential threat to the public of releasing criminal 
aliens and the need for enforcement to deter cross-border criminal 
activity, including human and drugsmuggling that are encouraged 
when the government tolerates illegal immigration.109
The Travis County Sheriff Greg Hamilton is cognizant of legal 
challenges to immigration detainers.110 Still, the sheriff’s office de-
fends the county’s decision as being within the scope of lawful activity 
because there is no risk of extended detentions when ICE operates 
within the jail and makes requests prior to release.111 Harris County 
Sheriff Adrian Garcia, whose county leads the state in detainers and 
who has been a vocal supporter of their use,112 similarly believes that 
state cooperation with federally-requested immigration detainers are 
legitimate and are only called into question when the policies are not 
properly or carefully implemented. He defends his county’s use of de-
tainers within the jails, prior to release, on similar grounds to Travis 
County’s reasoning.113
In contrast to Texas’s uniform, though localized, policies, Arizona 
counties adopt a patchwork of policies on immigration detainers in the 
years since its pro-immigration enforcement law, SB 1070, was struck 
 109.  Jessica Vaughan, Texas Data Confirm Declining Deportations, Cost of Alien Crime,
CTR. IMMIGRATION STUDIES (Mar. 5, 2014), http://cis.org/vaughan/texas-data-confirm-declining-
deportations-cost-alien-crime. 
 110.  Press Release, Travis Cty. Sheriff’s Office, Sheriff Greg Hamilton Continues Honoring 
ICE Detainers (2014) (on file at https://www.tcsheriff.org/about/media-relations/press-re-
leases/2014/261-sheriff-greg-hamilton-continues-honoring-ice-detainers).   
 111.  Id. See also Lomi Kriel, Immigration Screening Still Used in Texas as Other Agencies 
Withdraw, HOUS. CHRON. (Oct. 16, 2014), http://houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-
texas/houston/article/Immigration-screening-still-used-in-Texas-as-5828422.php.  
 112.  Id.
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down in 2012.114 Most famously, Maricopa County (including Phoenix) 
grants the highest number of detainers in the nation.115 The Sheriff of 
Maricopa County, Joe Arpaio, has been an avid supporter of the Se-
cure Communities program and believes that immigration detainers 
are a legitimate and necessary program.116 Despite the November 
2014 executive actions ending Secure Communities and lawsuits 
finding racial profiling in his immigration enforcement efforts, he con-
tinues to cooperate to the fullest extent possible with ICE and exhorts 
the federal government to do more to enforce immigration laws.117
While not every Arizonan county cooperates with detainers to the ex-
tent of Maricopa County, most counties tend to cooperate with federal 
detainer policy and share the sense that states and the federal gov-
ernment both have a place in immigration enforcement. South Tucson 
is a lonely exception that limits compliance following settlement of a 
lawsuit challenging its practices, suggesting that South Tucson is ac-
commodating evolving legal norms rather than acceding voluntar-
ily.118
 114.  Arizona has a history of robust immigration enforcement. SB 1070 strengthened state 
immigration enforcement in several ways, on the theory that the state would compensate for the 
federal government’s lax enforcement of immigration law. Arizona v. United States enjoined 
most SB 1070 provisions, including a provision permitting warrantless arrest for probable cause 
that a person committed crimes that would make him removable. See 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497, 
2507 (2012). Since 2012, many 287(g) agreements that empowered states to initiate these 
kinds of immigration-related arrests have been terminated and emphasis has shifted toward the 
use of federal ICE holds under Secure Communities.  
 115.  Immigration Holds at Maricopa County Jail in Arizona Top Nation, Study Says,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/26/immigration-
holds-at-maricopa-county-jail_n_2767417.html. 
 116.  See, e.g., Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772, 772 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that 
Proposition 100, which precludes bail for certain felony offenses for unlawfully present non-
citizens, violates substantive due process); Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(granting preliminary injunction prohibiting detaining or stopping individuals for traffic stop based 
solely on suspicions of unlawful presence). Sheriff Arpaio sued President Obama following the 
November 2014 executive actions, but his lawsuit was dismissed for lack of standing. Arpaio v. 
Obama, 27 F. Supp. 3d 185 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 117.  Id.
 118.  South Tucson limited its detainer practices as the result of a lawsuit brought on behalf 
of a detainee by the ACLU. As part of the settlement, South Tucson made it unlawful to detain 
an individual unless there is probable cause to suspect that the individual has committed or is 
about to commit a crime. See SOUTH TUCSON POLICE DEP’T, IMMIGRATION POLICY 3 (2014). The 
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III. RESTORING TRUST IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: STATE 
NONCOOPERATION AND SANCTUARY CITIES AFTER SECURE
COMMUNITIES
Part II provided an in-depth look at states and localities rewriting 
immigration enforcement policy by declining to cooperate with federal 
detainer requests.  This Part narrates the next stage of policy devel-
opment: the federal government’s efforts to restructure its partnership 
with LEAs while simultaneously limiting local influence in response to 
pressure from below. The policy developments illustrate the limits of 
top-down federal executive action and specifically what happens 
when states and localities refuse to cooperate with federal policy from 
below.
A. PEP Policy Reforms, November 2014 
After confronting years of criticism, the federal government refor-
mulated its immigration detainer policies by rescinding Secure Com-
munities and substituting PEP through an executive action in 
November 2014.119 Although the premise of federal-state-local part-
nership in both immigration enforcement programs is the same, and 
FBI and ICE will continue to share fingerprint data for purposes of 
identifying potentially removable individuals, the revamped detainer 
policy scales back ICE’s requests for state-local cooperation. The No-
vember 2014 immigration executive action announced “[t]he Secure 
Communities program, as we know it, will be discontinued.”120 In its 
place, PEP limits federal requests for immigration detainers in im-
portant respects. First, rather than asking LEAs to hold detained im-
migrants beyond their scheduled release from jail, ICE seeks 
notification of release dates from LEAs of scheduled release in most 
circumstances.121 Second, ICE will only request an LEA hold an im-
migrant for transfer of custody in “special circumstances,” such as 
 119.  For example, numerous congressional and executive investigations led to an ICE re-
port. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, ICE OFFICE OF THE DIR., PROTECTING THE HOMELAND:
ICE RESPONSE TO SECURE COMMUNITIES TASK FORCE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2
(2012). The report cites misunderstandings regarding role of local law enforcement, perceived 
inconsistencies between S-Comm goals and outcomes for high and low level bureaucracies 
(e.g. binding criteria and field enforcement), and unintended consequences for communities. It 
concludes with a section asking “Whether to suspend S-Comm.” Id. at 10, 12, 13. 
 120.  November 2014 Secure Communities Memo, supra note 1.  
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when the immigrant in custody has been convicted of a serious crime 
or poses a national security risk and there is probable cause that the 
immigrant is subject to a final removal order.122 The Revised Form I-
247D for detainers also asks that the LEA hold the named individual 
for no more than 48 hours, without listing exceptions.123 Other details 
of PEP’s operation will be worked out through additional guidance and 
developing practice. Whatever else changes, these two policy 
changes alone should result in fewer and more tailored federal de-
tainer requests. A Migration Policy Report estimates that the more 
precise and narrowly-tailored priorities memo in combination with 
PEP will reduce the total number of deportations from the interior by 
approximately 25,000.124
While the substantive changes are somewhat significant,125 what 
is most noteworthy about the November 2014 fall of Secure Commu-
nities is the way it reached its demise. The DHS memo itself credits 
the federal-state-local controversies with providing specific ideas for 
policy development, implying that the federal government learned 
 https://www.aclu.org/files/field_document/I-247N%20Request%20for%20Notifica-
tion%20SAMPLE.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2015) (Form I-247N – Request for Voluntary Notifi-
cation of Release of Suspected Priority Alien). This newly-drafted form requires ICE to state the 
basis for suspecting that an individual falls within ICE’s enforcement priorities related to criminal 
conviction or national security. It does not reference enforcement priorities based on civil immi-
gration violations only, such as recent border crossing.  
 122.  November 2014 Secure Communities Memo, supra note 1; Immigration Detainer – 
Notice of Action, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communi-
ties/pdf/immigration-detainer-form.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2015) (Form I-247D Immigration 
Detainer – Request for Voluntary Action). This revised form requires ICE to specify the criminal 
conviction or national security risk that renders the immigrant a high priority under the DHS 
enforcement guidance and to explain why ICE believes there is probable cause that the individ-
ual is removable. CRIMMIGRATION, http://crimmigration.com (last visited Sept. 23, 2015).  
 123.  November 2014 Secure Communities Memo, supra note 1; Immigration Detainer – 
Notice of Action, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communi-
ties/pdf/immigration-detainer-form.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2015) (Form I-247D Immigration 
Detainer – Request for Voluntary Action). 
 124.  This number could be offset by increased apprehensions at the border, which are a 
higher priority under the 2014 DHS memo. Marc Rosenblum, Understanding the Potential Im-
pact of Executive Action on Immigration Enforcement, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (July 2015), 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/understanding-potential-impact-executive-action-im-
migration-enforcement. 
 125.  Immigration experts disagree on how meaningful the changes will be. See, e.g., César 
García Hernández, PEP v. Secure Communities, CRIMMIGRATION (July 8, 2015), http://crimmi-
gration.com/2015/07/07/pep-vs-secure-communities/; Gabriela Mendez, Let’s Have a PEP 
Talk: Is This S-Comm 2.0?, IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (May 28, 2015), http://lawprofes-
sors.typepad.com/immigration/2015/05/lets-have-a-pep-talk-is-this-s-comm-20.html; Cf. Suzy 
Khimm, Building a Kindler, Gentler Deportation Machine, NEW REPUBLIC (July 28, 2015), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/122387/building-kinder-gentler-deportation-machine; Ros-
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from state and local feedback.126 This federal government’s respon-
siveness toward local resistance is conspicuous evidence that unco-
operative federalism influenced federal policy development. That is, 
states and localities (often at the behest of immigration advocates) 
voiced their dissatisfaction and their concerns were heard—at least in 
the two respects described and incorporated into the revamped pol-
icy. The DHS memo mentions the state and local resistance to Secure 
Communities on Fourth Amendment and other grounds as part of its 
justification for ending the program: 
[Secure Communities] has attracted a great deal of criticism, is 
widely misunderstood, and is embroiled in litigation; its very name 
has become a symbol for general hostility toward the enforcement 
of our immigration laws. Governors, mayors, and state and local 
law enforcement officials around the country have increasingly re-
fused to cooperate with the program, and many have issued exec-
utive orders or signed laws prohibiting such cooperation.127
Going beyond its references to the Fourth Amendment litigation, 
the DHS memo expressly references the lack of public confidence in 
immigration detainer practices and seems to recognize the value of 
public participation and trust-building between LEAs and federal law 
enforcement in its closing paragraph: 
[A]cquainting state and local governments, and their law enforce-
ment components, with this policy change will be crucial to its suc-
cess. I therefore direct the Assistant Secretary for 
Intergovernmental Affairs to formulate a plan and coordinate an ef-
fort to engage state and local governments about this and related 
changes to our enforcement policies. I am willing to personally par-
ticipate in these discussions.128
Whether or not DHS can succeed in rebuilding community trust 
around partnerships with law enforcement—especially among those 
who fundamentally disbelieve that LEAs should be involved in immi-
gration enforcement or who fundamentally challenge civil immigration 
detention—the DHS memo recognizes that substantive reform will not 
be enough; it is not just what happens that needs to change, but the 
way things happen that needs to change. 
 126.  See November 2014 Secure Communities Memo, supra note 1 (referencing Fourth 
Amendment litigation). 
 127.  See Id.
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B. PEP Implementation, July 2015 to Present 
Restoring trust in the legitimacy of immigration enforcement will 
be the central issue in the vitality of immigration detainers going for-
ward with PEP implementation. The policy feedback between state-
local detainer practice and federal policy suggests how. While legiti-
macy and legality were intertwined, legitimacy became the central is-
sue in the demise of Secure Communities. Legitimacy functioned in 
tandem with lawsuits because the grave constitutional harms at issue 
invoked legitimacy concerns; the Fourth Amendment is substantive 
and also concerned with procedural due process, which is a core 
component of legitimacy in Tom Tyler’s research. Litigation over FOIA 
disclosures underscored mistrust of government motives, another key 
component. It could also be that judicial declarations of a policy’s le-
gality send signals about the policy’s legitimacy in a legal system gov-
erned by judicial norms that considers past legal interpretations a 
source of legitimate authority.129 In either explanation, legality bol-
stered legitimacy by influencing state and local perceptions of federal 
authority, not solely or automatically because a federal court bound 
states and localities to the conclusion that state and local cooperation 
with federal immigration detainers requests is illegal. Confronted with 
a nonbinding federal policy that depends on voluntary cooperation for 
its successful implementation, legality and legitimacy constitute one 
another and together function as constraints on cooperative policy-
making.
Given that PEP will inherit state and local skepticism of the Se-
cure Communities program that it replaced, the Obama administration 
has significant work to do around the use of executive action to 
prompt states and counties to prolong custody beyond scheduled re-
lease. Presumably the DHS guidance stating that the Secure Com-
munities program will be discontinued sends a message to those who 
distrusted it that DHS is making a fresh start. As an L.A. Times article 
said in its description of the policy change, “For the immigrant advo-
cates who for years have been calling on President Obama to curtail 
deportations, the Secure Communities program symbolized what was 
 129.  Richard Fallon explains this partly as the product of a tradition of precedent and stare 
decisis in which past legal interpretations constitute a source of legitimate authority. Fallon, 
supra note 10, at 1793. It is also partly a product of strategic uses of illegitimacy. Id. at 1818 
(“[W]hereas an ascription of legal legitimacy often claims less than that a judicial judgment was 
correct, an allegation of illegitimacy almost invariably implies more than that a legal judgment 
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wrong with the nation’s immigration enforcement strategy.”130 As 
Chris Newman of the National Day Laborer Organizing Network 
(which had challenged Secure Communities in court) said, “There’s 
finally recognition that the Secure Communities experiment was a fail-
ure.”131 Making substantive changes to an admittedly failed program 
suggests respect for the rule of law and signals the federal govern-
ment’s responsiveness to the content of the concerns, even if not all 
of them. Whether critics will embrace Secure Communities’ replace-
ment, which some derisively refer to as Pep-comm to underscore its 
similarities to its predecessor, depends partly on its effectiveness and 
fidelity to its stated objectives—the President’s focus on “Felons, not 
families. Criminals, not children”132—and the fairness of its implemen-
tation among other things. As crime and immigration scholar Eisha 
Jain notes, “[in] the immigration context, the link between arrests and 
deportation can serve to legitimate immigration enforcement choices 
by demonstrating that immigration enforcement officials are focusing 
on ‘criminal aliens,’ and not on those who may be seen as having 
more compelling claims to membership, such as long-term unauthor-
ized immigrants who have had no contact with the criminal justice 
system.”133 César García Hernández, a scholar of crime and immigra-
tion who is critical of civil detention generally, cautiously notes that 
limitations on detainers that exempt those lacking criminal convictions 
and national security risk represents “a step in the right direction” to-
ward a less punitive immigration enforcement approach.134 While lim-
itations on the scope of detainers and limitations on use will not 
change the overarching structure of state-local-federal partnership in 
immigration enforcement135 or the mission of targeting criminal aliens 
 130.  Kate Linthicum, Obama Ends Secure Communities Program as Part of Immigration 
Action, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-1121-immigra-
tion-justice-20141121-story.html.
 131.  Id.
 132.  In the announcement, President Obama went on to compare his prioritization with the 
kind of prioritization that all law enforcement undertakes, everyday (also in keeping with Tyler’s 
legitimacy criteria of building identification with local/frontline officials). The President Speaks 
on Fixing America’s Broken Immigration System, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 20, 2014)
https://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2014/11/20/president-speaks-fixing-
americas-broken-immigration-system. 
 133.  Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 831 (2015). 
 134.  García Hernández qualifies the statement by saying that ICE is still off-course, even if 
stepping in right direction. García Hernández, supra note 125. 
 135.  Vigorous disagreement about the bigger picture of state involvement in local law en-
forcement and preemption battles dominates current literature. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox, Immi-
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for deportation,136 they can reign in excess and safeguard against il-
legality. This will be especially true if ICE takes seriously the manner 
of documenting and validating probable cause that an individual is 
removable, perhaps by interposing an independent verifier of cause 
that approximates the probable cause procedures to execute a war-
rant in criminal court.137 The probable cause showing and warrant is 
garnering even more attention following San Francisco’s release of a 
Juan Francisco Lopez-Sanchez, an undocumented immigrant with 
prior felony convictions and removal orders, who killed U.S. citizen 
Kathryn Steinle shortly after his release.138 Lopez-Sanchez was re-
leased from jail despite ICE’s requests to hold him pursuant to a local 
sanctuary policy that prevented ICE holds without warrant on the 
same day that PEP implementation was scheduled to begin. The 
events sparked a firestorm of controversy over the balance of crime 
control and community discretion in immigration enforcement that in-
cludes congressional hearings over mandatory federal immigration 
Reverse-Commandeering, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 535, 627 (2012); Michael A. Olivas, Immigra-
tion-Related State and Local Ordinances: Preemption Prejudice, and the Proper Role for En-
forcement, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 34 (2007); Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise 
of State and Local Power Over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1560–64 (2007–08); Michael 
J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and 
Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 551–52 (2001). Cf. Clare Huntington, The Constitutional 
Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 788 n.6 (2008); Martin, supra note 
32, at 454–55 (believes in “carefully structured fed-state cooperation” and says PEP only makes 
sense as an interim measure to “stop the bleeding”). The President’s Task Force on 21st Century 
Policing generally questions the involvement of LEAs with federal immigration enforcement and 
specifically recommends that ICE discontinues notification and transfer requests under PEP. 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY 
POLICING 18 (2015) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE].
 136.  See Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adju-
dication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1579–98 (2010) (on asym-
metries of procedural protections in civil immigration enforcement); Ingrid Eagley, Prosecuting 
Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. Rev. 1281, 1281 (2010); Steve Legomsky, Asymmetric Incorporation 
of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 469–70 (2007). García Hernández says: 
“PEP isn’t a panacea for the severity of modern immigration law enforcement. Many migrants 
will still be sanctioned twice—once by the criminal justice system and a second time by the 
immigration law regime. Hundreds of thousands will continue to find themselves sucked into the 
immigration detention and removal pipeline annually.” García Hernández, supra note 125.  
 137.  David Martin suggests that immigration judges or magistrate judges could perform 
such a check. Martin, supra note 32, at 457. 
 138.  Lee Romney et al., Fatal Shooting of S.F. Woman Reveals Disconnect Between ICE, 
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detainers,139 legislative proposals to suspend federal funding for lo-
calities with sanctuary policies,140 and community forums to re-evalu-
ate sanctuary policies in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and 
elsewhere.141
The initial sentiment stirred up by Steinle’s killing—against Sanc-
tuary Cities with noncooperation policies and in favor of more strin-
gent federal immigration enforcement—has calmed as public 
attention turns toward the presidential campaigns and other issues. 
However, the pendulum shift is from opposition to the feds toward a 
more balanced approach. Investigations into non-detainer policies fol-
lowing Steinle’s killing—in Los Angeles, for example, where ICE 
agents have been readmitted to jails—mean that communities recog-
nize they need to be active partners in policymaking, not merely pro-
testors against federal policy. The kinds of policies they are setting in 
place resemble the critical elements of PEP: a more fine-grained con-
sideration of serious convictions in ICE’s decision to request cooper-
ation and an equally-fine grained consideration on the part of local 
jails to grant or not grant those requests. 
Procedurally, the effect of the changed political climate is to bol-
ster the credibility of ICE. The concerns about recidivism are not un-
founded, as it turns out. DHS’ willingness to remain open to 
community partnership, rather than cracking down, will be important 
as communities formulate responses. Still, recognizing the lineage of 
the two detainer programs, rather than reacting to the more recent 
uproar over the Steinle killing, could ease PEP implementation on 
 139.  DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson and ICE Director Sarah Saldana repeatedly emphasized 
in their congressional testimony the need for “cooperation” with local authorities, rather than 
mandatory immigration detention. Immigration Enforcement Oversight: Hearing on Immigration 
Before H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Jeh Charles Johnson, 
Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security) (on video at http://www.c-span.org/video/?327074-
1/homeland-security-secretary-jeh-johnson-testimony-oversight-hearing).  
 140.  Legislative proposals immediately following the Karthyn Steinle killing include passage 
of H.R. 3009 Enforce the Law for Sanctuary Cities Act and proposed Kate’s Laws in the House 
and Senate. H.R. 3009, 114th Cong. (2015). Congress’ efforts to enact legislation stalled upon 
return from recess in fall 2015, with the failure of S.2146, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 141.  Kate Linthicum & Lee Romney, L.A. County Considers New Immigration Program for 
Jails in Light of S.F. Slaying, L.A. TIMES (July 19, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/califor-
nia/la-me-immigration-jails-20150720-story.html; Laura M. Holson, San Francisco Votes the 
Keep Shielding Immigrants From Deportation Officials, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/21/us/san-francisco-votes-to-keep-shielding-immigrants-
from-deportation-officials.html?_r=2; Alice Popovici, Will Sanctuary Cities Survive, CRIME 
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procedural grounds.142 The noncooperation seen in the state and lo-
cal resistance to Secure Communities presents a playbook for build-
ing PEP in its wake that is not significantly altered by recent events. 
Immigrants’ rights advocates might continue to be skeptical of the sin-
cerity or trustworthiness of ICE given the origins of the program, its 
confusing and changing signals to community over Secure Commu-
nities implementation, its uneven execution of state-local cooperation 
agreements, and its continued use of detainer techniques deemed 
unfair to immigrants and damaging to community trust. Upon release 
of PEP guidance, the ACLU and a dozen civil and immigrants’ rights 
organizations issued a letter expressing concern to DHS Secretary 
Jeh Johnson.143 The tenor of their objections are both substantive and 
procedural, and their subtext suggests damaged relationships too 
broken for repair. Chastened by the Steinle killing and hampered by 
Congress’ proposals to penalize local communities for not cooperat-
ing with federal immigration enforcement and to strengthen federal 
immigration enforcement by making detainers mandatory (rather than 
continue down the path of making federal enforcement more reliant 
on local cooperation through PEP), immigration advocates issued a 
second letter reminding Congress that “[g]ood policies are made over 
time, by examining our shared values and opinions, and by working 
toward equality and justice for all people.”144 In other words, the im-
migration advocates caution overreacting to the Steinle killing with re-
tributive policies, even as they recognize that rebuilding trust is an 
 142.  Legal analysts disagree about how similar PEP will be to Secure Communities. Martin, 
supra note 32, at 457. The ACLU lays out an interpretation and approach toward PEP that would 
improve upon Secure Communities. Memorandum from the Am. Civil Liberties Union on DHS’ 
Discontinued Secure Communities Program, Detainer Reforms, and PEP (Dec. 17, 2014) (on 
file with the American Civil Liberties Union). Others have been more skeptical that there will be 
a meaningful difference between the programs. IMMIGRATION LEGAL RES. CTR., ORGANIZER
ALERT: LIFE AFTER “PEP-COMM” 1, 2–3 (2014); Emily Creighton, Do the President’s New En-
forcement Policies Really Mark the End of Secure Communities, IMMIGRATION IMPACT (Dec. 30, 
2014), http://immigrationimpact.com/2014/12/30/do-the-presidents-new-immigration-policies-
really-mark-the-end-of-secure-communities/; Ted Hessen, Top Immigration Officials Pitch New 
Fingerprint-Sharing Program To Wary Activists, FUSION (May 10, 2015), http://fu-
sion.net/story/132279/top-immigration-officials-pitch-new-fingerprint-sharing-program-to-wary-
activists/; Let’s Have a PEP Talk: Is this Secure Communities 2.0?, IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG
(May 21, 2015), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/. 
 143.  Letter from Am. Civil Liberties Union et al., to Jeh Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Home-
land Sec. (June 17, 2015) (on file with the American Civil Liberties Union) (“Short of discontin-
uing detainers and notifications, ICE and the local law enforcement agencies that respond to 
detainers or notifications will continue to incur liability for making illegal arrests and jeopardize 
polic[e]-community trust.”). 
 144.  Immigrants’ rights organizations, led by the National Immigration Law Center and 
United We Dream, wrote in opposition to a House bill to block funding for sanctuary cities. See
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ongoing process. The sobering message from Steinle’s killing is that 
cooperation is a two-way affair and protest by itself is not a policy. 
They need to become partners in policymaking. 
Troubled relationships can be rehabilitated and restored under 
the right circumstances. Although they were writing before the Steinle 
killing, David Martin and Cristina Rodríguez remain optimistic about 
the promise of DHS’ revamped approach and community outreach. In 
a recent article for a symposium journal, Martin holds out hope that 
certain cooperative elements of Secure Communities that “thread the 
needle” between LEAs overzealous immigration enforcement (rela-
tive to ICE priorities) and disruption of LEAs primary mission of crim-
inal law enforcement by cities with noncooperation or sanctuary 
policies could again be used under “more auspicious conditions.”145
By this Martin means changed political conditions that permit restora-
tion of cooperative relationships in enforcement, such as a combina-
tion of reduced undocumented migration, broad legalization, and 
resolute enforcement. What it takes to realize those conditions is hard 
to predict, but the enhanced credibility of ICE’s mission and the des-
perate need for a coordinated approach toward enforcement after the 
Steinle killing may turn out to be a critical ingredient. As Rodríguez 
says in an article for the same symposium journal, “[n]ow that DHS 
has reformulated its approach to enforcement in light of the multi-fac-
eted criticism of Secure Communities, the turn toward cooperation 
and away from confrontation requires local officials to respond in 
kind.”146 Some immigration advocates will never sign on to a vision of 
immigration enforcement involving active participation from LEAs, es-
pecially a vision involving civil detention. However, other immigration 
advocates may move forward from the Steinle killing understanding 
that cooperation is a two-way endeavor that involves the federal gov-
ernment reaching out just as much as it involves communities reach-
ing back. Introspection within communities about what constitutes a 
sanctuary city and which detainer policies strike the right balance be-
tween community trust, crime control, and cooperative immigration 
enforcement is painful and involves not always constructive finger 
pointing—feds versus states, county sheriffs versus city officials, us 
versus them. But the more nuanced reflection about whether and how 
 145.  Martin, supra note 32, at 438, 453 (auspicious conditions and gradual restoration of 
wider cooperation). 
 146.  Cristina Rodríguez, Toward Détente in Immigration Enforcement, 30 J. L. & POL. 505, 
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to engage with the DHS’ invitation to cooperate is a positive develop-
ment, even if cities may not all decide to accept. Indeed, the lack of 
uniformity is baked into the design of PEP; the Migration Policy Insti-
tute characterizes PEP’s ambitions as “replacing uniform national in-
formation-sharing and detainer models with individualized 
jurisdictional protocols”, with the goal—but not the guarantee—of en-
couraging more counties to opt-in again.147
However communities respond to DHS’ invitation to cooperate 
with its enforcement efforts, an invitation issued in earnest following 
the Steinle killing that ironically occurred the same day that PEP was 
scheduled for full implementation, DHS’ message that “we hear you” 
aligns nicely with democratic norms that are both procedural and sub-
stantive in character. The framework of cooperation and the language 
of partnership, seeking buy-in from the bottom-up, is also consistent 
with the styles of regulatory responsiveness that have proved more 
effective than old-styles of mandates and commands from the top-
down.148 Demonstrating that the federal government is respecting 
those not legally-bound to follow is particularly important for an exec-
utive action—an instrument vulnerable to claims of unilateralism, 
usurpation, and overreaching. It builds the sense of the government’s 
“respect-worthiness” and “responsiveness” and fosters cooperation. 
The ICE Director who took charge shortly after the detainer policies 
changed has not always done well on this front, and the Obama ad-
ministration is showing that it takes seriously the need to maintain 
improved relationships with its partners in crime control.149
 147.  Marc Rosenblum, Understanding the Potential Impact of Executive Action on Immigra-
tion Enforcement, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (July 2015), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/re-
search/understanding-potential-impact-executive-action-immigration-enforcement. 
 148.  John Braithwaite and Ian Ayres place such nonbinding guidance in the middle of a 
pyramid of regulation that ranges from command and control to self-regulation. IAN AYRES & 
JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 19
(1992). 
 149.  ICE Director Sarah Saldaña might have undermined some community trust when she 
responded “Amen” to a congressional query about whether she thought Congress should “clar-
ify the law” to require state and local law enforcement to lock up immigrants at the request of 
ICE. Saldaña recanted the next day, conceding that her response contradicted Secretary John-
son’s observation that an increasing number of federal court decisions hold that detention based 
on ICE requests to state and local law enforcement agencies violates the Fourth Amendment. 
See Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, Statement from U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement Director Sarah R. Saldaña (Mar. 20, 2015) (on file with the U.S. Immi-
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It is still too early to systematically study state and local re-
sponses to PEP implementation or opine on PEP’s successes or fail-
ures.150 Much will depend on the implementation of its provisions, 
including novel ones calling for notification and vaguely familiar ones 
that permit ICE holds under “special circumstances” and the manner 
in which probable cause is documented and validated.151 No number 
of released PEP forms can make that clear. Internal quality control 
will remain an issue as LEAs exercise discretion as they implement 
the new criteria. Also at issue will be the reaction of LEAs to ICE’s 
requests under PEP, partly conditioned on the political and legal cli-
mate.  As Jain notes, 
enforcement necessarily depends on whether jails cooperate with 
ICE notification requests prior to the release of inmates. Wide-
spread refusal to comply with detainers played a role in undermin-
ing the efficacy of Secure Communities—a fact that ICE 
acknowledged in transitioning to the Priority Enforcement Program. 
If local law enforcement agencies continue to ignore ICE’s new re-
quests for notification, then immigration enforcement officials will 
have limited ability to apprehend suspected unauthorized immi-
grants, even after reviewing their arrest information.152
In other words, cooperation will fail. At the same time, local com-
munities’ reflexive opposition to ICE requests will also impede trust 
and effective policymaking. They need to show that they are being 
reasonable for the DHS to remain open to their active partnership. 
Already, immigration advocates are highlighting TRAC statistics 
showing that requests for detainers under PEP may be down, but they 
are not tailored to seriousness of convictions—meaning they would 
not have prevented Steinle’s killing and that the decreased rates are 
less important than the perceptions of fairness in the meting out of 
detainer requests.153
Based on the legitimacy theory developed in this Article, state 
and local responses to continuing federal requests for detention or 
notification post-PEP could go a number of ways. LEAs may continue 
 150.  Preliminary data show a decrease in ICE detainer requests under PEP, but local re-
sponses to those requests will require monitoring before patterns can be discerned. See Further 
Decrease in ICE Detainer Use, TRAC REPORT (Aug. 28, 2015), http://trac.syr.edu/immigra-
tion/reports/402/. 
 151.  César García Hernández and David Martin suggest that probable cause should be 
strengthened for both ICE notification and ICE holds. García Hernández, supra note 125; Mar-
tin, supra note 32, at 455. 
 152.  Jain, supra note 133, at 833. 
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to withhold cooperation for fear of continuing jurisdictional liability, un-
resolved concerns about the trustworthiness of ICE, or steadfast con-
viction about the futility of eroding trust between local police and 
immigrant communities.154 Some LEAs might show greater coopera-
tion with disciplined detainer requests that seem more legitimate on 
procedural and substantive grounds, especially if ICE can establish 
that they are tailoring requests and not merely lowering the overall 
number of requests, or choose to cooperate when faced with threats 
of legal or political reprisal for not doing so. Yet others might be less 
cooperative with detainer requests on the theory that the federal gov-
ernment’s respect-worthiness is diminished by the DHS’ own admis-
sion that the Secure Communities program was illegitimately 
administered and procedurally defective or that PEP implementation 
remains insufficiently responsive to preexisting concerns. Congress’ 
divisive proposals to penalize Sanctuary Cities raise the stakes of 
concession. Some might feel increased trust toward the federal gov-
ernment if it maintains the DHS’ more open and responsive style of 
regulation, notwithstanding recent events. Only time will tell. 
At the risk of overly speculating about whether states will coop-
erate with PEP, legitimacy theory sheds light on how they will make 
their decisions. A recent strand of Tom Tyler’s legitimacy research 
focuses on cooperation in the context of law enforcement and legal 
authorities—defined as police, courts, and the law—rather than more 
generalized settings such as traffic offenses, speeding tickets and 
parking fines.155 As with the original research, Tyler’s new research is 
designed to shed light on decisional factors beyond instrumental and 
normative motivations. The new studies reveal two forms of voluntary 
action that directly help the police, and legitimacy matters to them 
both: (1) cooperation by voluntarily providing the police information 
relevant to public safety objectives, and (2) civic engagement and 
community investment in local police activities.156 In the context of 
post-PEP immigration law enforcement, both types of discretion and 
 154.  Around the same time that the Steinle murder took over headlines, the American Im-
migration Council released a much-publicized report showing that immigrants are typically not 
criminals. See WALTER EWING ET AL., THE CRIMINALIZATION OF IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 1–2 (2015). 
 155.  TYLER, WHY PEOPLE COOPERATE, supra note 7, at 32–45, 66 (Chapter 4: Cooperation 
with legal authorities defined as the police, the courts, and the law).  
 156.  This discussion of civic engagement overlaps Tom Tyler’s discussion of cooperation 
with political authorities, e.g. when communities will go along with the president based on his 
institutional authority, as opposed to when local officials will go along with federal immigration 
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voluntary cooperation are salient. PEP relies on counties and local 
jails to voluntarily disclose critical information about immigration sta-
tus in response to ICE’s request for notification of the impending re-
lease of persons they have probable cause to believe are removable 
under the enforcement criteria.  Prior experience with 287(g) agree-
ments and other predecessors to the Secure Communities and PEP 
programs have shown that ICE cannot obtain custody for civil immi-
gration enforcement proceedings nearly as efficiently or effectively 
without LEA-federal government partnership. On the issue of civic en-
gagement and community investment, the promised openness of the 
federal government to community input following the cessation of Se-
cure Communities renders it keenly dependent on the community’s 
opinions of the federal government’s reputation. Right now there is 
disagreement within communities at-large about whether they ought 
to encourage policies and practices of cooperation with detainers 
post-PEP. The president’s Task Force on Policing names as Pillar 
One in its report “building trust and legitimacy,” and it invokes Tyler’s 
research for this philosophical foundation toward improved polic-
ing.157 The Task Force Report admonishes the DHS to decouple fed-
eral immigration enforcement and local policing activities, specifically 
mentioning notifications and requests to transfer.158 Still, many 
acknowledge that PEP coupled with the new enforcement priorities 
represents a significant shift toward an immigration enforcement strat-
egy that is more sensitive to the realities of undocumented migration, 
fairer to long-time residents, and effective in crime control and com-
munity protection.159 The real test of PEP’s legitimacy, however, will 
come once PEP is fully implemented in all jurisdictions and empirical 
study can be undertaken of whether and why states and localities 
choose to cooperate with it.160
 157.  REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE, supra note 135, at 1 (“When any part of the 
American family does not feel like it is being treated fairly, that’s a problem for all of us.”).  
 158. Id. at 18; Letter from Am. Civil Liberties Union et al., to Jeh Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t 
of Homeland Sec. (June 17, 2015) (on file with the American Civil Liberties Union); Press Re-
lease, Judiciary Comm. Chairman Bob Goodlatte, Goodlatte: Implementation of Priority En-
forcement Program Endangers Our Communities (June 23, 2015) (on file with the U.S. House 
of Representatives).  
 159.  Jerry Markon, Obama Administration Scales Back Deportations in Policy Shift, WASH.
POST. (July 2, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/dhs-scales-back-deportations-
aims-to-integrate-illegal-immigrants-into-society/2015/07/02/890960d2-1b56-11e5-93b7-
5eddc056ad8a_story.html. 
 160.  Similar empirical studies of 287(g) agreements exist. See HEATHER CREEK & STEPHEN
YODER, WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM OUR FEDS: UNDERSTANDING STATE/FEDERAL COOPERATION ON
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 1–3 (2010); Katherine M. Donato et al., Police Arrests in a Time of 
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CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the changing pattern of cooperation with Secure Com-
munities on the basis of intertwining legitimacy and legality suggests 
a policy cycle with substantive and procedural dimensions.  The dif-
fusion of substantive policy changes and procedural reforms from Se-
cure Communities to its PEP replacement—and the interruption of 
Steinle’s killing by an immigration release despite a detainer re-
quest—illustrates policy learning between federal, state, and county 
government.  The policy influence loops from the federal government 
to states and localities (in the form of ICE detainer requests), from 
states and localities back to the federal government (in policies that 
accept, condition, or decline to follow detainer policy), and from the 
federal government back to the states and localities (in PEP’s modi-
fied terms for detainer requests). Presumably policy will cycle again 
as state responses to ICE detainer requests under PEP set the con-
ditions for continuing requests. If states seem thoughtful and reason-
able, ICE may meet them in turn; if they seem reflexive and 
recalcitrant in spite of harmful events, ICE may become more indis-
criminate in their requests. Ultimately, policy development may be 
slowed but not stalled by shocks like the Steinle killing and congres-
sional intervention. Once a policy cycle is in motion, its momentum is 
not easily impeded, even if it is not unalterable. 
Cooperative governance continually remakes immigration en-
forcement policy, adapting to changing political and legal conditions. 
Immigration detainers provide a rich study of the process by which 
these policies evolve. The study can and should be extended as PEP 
is implemented in cities and counties across the nation. The com-
bined case study heralds lessons for other federal laws calling upon 
state and local cooperation for their successful execution. Within im-
migration law, that includes DACA and the still unfolding litigation over 
the Deferred Action for Parental Arrivals (DAPA) program.161 States 
(2014); U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., THE PERFORMANCE OF
287(g) AGREEMENTS: FY 2011 UPDATE (2011); MIGRATION POLICY INST., DELEGATION AND
DIVERGENCE: A STUDY OF 287(g) STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 18–19 (2011) 
(showing only half detained under 287(g) committed serious crime); Tara Watson, Enforcement 
and Immigrant Location Choice (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19626, 
2013) (287(g) task force model doubles likelihood of immigrants to move); Paul G. Lewis et al., 
Why Do Some City Police Departments Enforce Federal Immigration Law?, J. PUB. ADMIN. RES.
& THEORY 1, 10 (2012) (studying 2007-2008 police checks for violent crime versus traffic stops).
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have shown broad acceptance of DACA in their policymaking on driv-
ers’ licenses, higher education, and health care.162 Whether they will 
continue to do so, if the injunction is lifted on the DAPA program, re-
mains to be seen. It will depend critically on President Obama’s rep-
utation after litigation that stirs up concerns about the legitimacy of 
executive action. Beyond immigration, it includes health care and the 
environment and other policies premised on executive actions and 
reliant on state cooperation for their successful implementation. State 
compliance with the Affordable Care Act has been uneven, with indi-
cations that President Obama’s forcefulness in pushing through the 
legislation has had lasting consequences even as the Supreme Court 
upholds the law’s legality.163 State cooperation with environmental 
regulations after the Supreme Court’s limiting of agency power could 
follow a parallel track to DAPA.164 Trust in the legitimacy of one’s pol-
icymaking partners matters wherever law hinges on public ac-
ceptance rather than solely on assertions of power, which is to say 
legitimacy matters nearly everywhere. 
 162.  Chen, supra note 2. 
 163.  King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
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